INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: The Tharoor Candidacy - The Campaign is the Message

The Opening Gambit

Marshall McLuhan may be intrigued to learn that the medium is no longer the message. The era of liquid foreign relations is giving birth to another paradigm wherein the campaign is the message. And, the more fortified the campaign, the stronger the message. So what is the message of the Tharoor candidacy, and how does the Tharoor campaign gain extra punch?

Why did India nominate Tharoor for the post?

Geopolitics and diplomacy aside, the most significant reason for the nomination of Tharoor is a transformation in Indian foreign policy based upon a shift in culture and recent experiential learning. The Indian society is moving towards a “to-do” and aggressive culture as opposed to decades of somnolent living. This shift in attitudes and culture, along with increasing globalization, especially, of the elite, is breeding confidence in the Indian economy and strategic circles. To cap these attitude changes, the newly found and ongoing experience of international lobbying and diplomacy in public for the U.S. India nuclear deal is culturally prompting the Indian establishment to be entrepreneurial in international relations.

What is in it for India?

A whole lot. It is not only about brand India, and a feel-good factor about the Secretary General being of Indian origin. That it is, and surely one does not expect the SG to be an extension of Indian establishment in Turtle Bay, so that is not a benefit. However, the key benefit which is not being credited is the deeper significance – the campaign is the message. By undertaking this campaign to canvass and lobby for the nomination of Tharoor, India is signaling a flexing of its geopolitical and lobbying muscles. This campaign, coming on the heels, and actually overlapping another strategic campaign underway (the civil nuclear deal and lobbying in the U.S.) is building the lobbying, diplomatic, negotiating, positioning, and realpolitik skills and capacity of Indian foreign policy. The campaign is sending a message that Indian capabilities in the geopolitical arena are now being marshaled in an aggressive and creative manner. Both of these campaigns – the ongoing lobbying for the nuclear deal; and the looming campaign for Tharoor, are providing invaluable experience and competency building of Indian strategic thought. The game for India is its ability to project its power and offerings to the world.

What must Tharoor do? Resign he must, and …

…well, the list may run long, and wiser counsels will have several suggestions. Yet, a few things which must be considered immediately include, first of all, a resignation. Tharoor must resign from his position and then campaign. What does he lose – a few months salary at most? If he is elected he will be the SG. If he loses he cannot serve the UN in any case. Having campaigned and argued against the vision of his competitors’, how moral would it be to then serve under an alternative vision? In his campaign he will have to critique and shred apart alternative visions, and express confidence in his and only his vision. It would not behoove Tharoor’s stature to then reconcile his vision for the mere sake of office. He is too refined a gentleman and in any case the literary world is awaiting him in all earnestness!

Once he resigns he can freely conduct his private and public diplomacy, and lobbying, to win votes. He should also categorically state that if and when India gets a seat in the UN with a veto, he would resign his post as Secretary General, since a SG cannot be from any Permanent Member. This will nip the compromise theories’ doing the rounds about India’s bid for the UN Security Council.

Having covered his base, the next step for Tharoor will be to define one single, concise visionary message for his candidacy. That message is obviously about UN reforms. In articulating his vision for UN reform, Tharoor will have to critique the present dispensation, and will thus have to step out of Kofi Annan’s shadows. He should not be perceived as a candidate of Annan, which his competitors,’ and may be even the U.S. media, will attempt to portray. There is not much love lost for Annan in U.S. foreign policy circles, particularly those whose support may be crucial for Tharoor’s candidacy.

The winning candidate for the SG should challenge the geopolitical unreality of the present U.N. based on a charter written 60 years ago to serve the purposes of the victors of World War II. He should be talking about putting reality to the U.N. of 1945 whether he gets the job or not. From India’s point of view, it will do well for all candidates for the SG to be reminded that population, and past contributions to the U.N. system, are the most important criteria. The U.N. charter begins with the sentence “We the peoples of the world…” – and not states, or countries.

Tharoor should be independent, bold and aggressive in his analysis and comments on the future of the U.N. In fact, Tharoor should make statements that will show he is impartial, independent, and most imaginative in reforming the U.N. structurally and administratively. Even if Tharoor does not make it, the global community and India will benefit if he were to make his thinking public on structural reform of the U.N. and the Security Council. Tharoor must show that he has his own personality and must spell out his recommendations for the reform of the U.N. based upon his rich experience of over 26 years at the U.N., and bring out a formula on composition of the Security Council acceptable to all its present permanent members. This is the true national offering of India to the U.N. system.

Administratively, Tharoor could become a revolutionary manager by at least proposing cutting the staff from its present level to ½, making the UN lean and mean, thus reducing the cost of operations. As one of my good friends, and a crafty protégé of Krishna Menon, Ven Parameswaran, said, “Tharoor should buy the biggest whipsaw in town and trim the present organization”. In doing this he has to dismantle the Annan legacy, and thus will need to stride boldly. If he does not resign he will not be able to do this.

Having framed his candidacy, Tharoor will be then launching an integrated campaign of public diplomacy and lobbying to win over as many stakeholders as possible. Such a campaign, as will unfold in the coming months, will test and expand international lobbying skills of India. Various stakeholders will pitch in, including the Indian American community, which is proud to see the emerging sophistication of Indian thought, as represented in the persona of Tharoor. The U.S. will be a key force in deciding the next SG, and the proactive support of the Indian American community will be a strong factor in Tharoor’s favor. The international, and Indian American, lobbying for Tharoor’s campaign will be crafted in the coming weeks, and is maybe the topic of another article.

For now, the campaign is the message.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS: A cross-cultural analysis of current issues in the Indo U.S. nuclear deal

There are two key issues which have cropped up in this past couple of days that merit a better understanding of the calculus of the negotiations that are going on to consummate the civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Both of these issues must be examined with the lens of cross-cultural communications to explain such baffling developments.

The first issue is the question of why the Americans are adding conditions after conditions to the deal, which supposedly has been agreed to between the two governments at the highest levels? The second issue is why several lawmakers in the U.S. are seemingly supportive of the deal, yet there is no action on the ground by them? A large part of the answer to both these questions lies in cross-cultural communications.

Let us first deal with the seeming propensity of American interlocutors to add conditions to the deal even while India keeps fending off such amendments or additions. The latest spanner in the works is the insistence by American interlocutors that India should return any material or equipment acquired under the deal if either side terminates the deal or is perceived to be in violation of the letter or spirit of the agreement for cooperation in civil nuclear energy. The diplomacy in public, and public diplomacy, over the next few days on this issue can be well forecast – bowing to its domestic constituencies, India will need to publicly reject such a proposal, and the State Department will most probably have to go back to the drawing board.

Such a tango on several propositions between the U.S. and India has already played out often in the public sphere, and one can safely hazard a guess that this latest proposal too will meet a similar fate. Remember the brouhaha about the 123 agreement a few weeks ago? Once it became known that the American interlocutors were keen on including that as one of the conditions of the deal, India’s response was an immediate and reflexive public denial and rejection. So, why are such conditions being added to the deal on an ongoing basis?

The U.S. is traditionally a “low context” culture, whereas India is typically a “high context” culture. A low context culture assumes no context to any relationship, and safeguards itself by spelling out each and every term of the relationship on paper. High context cultures, on the other hand, assume that there is a significant context and trust to the relationship, and therefore do not reduce the complete understanding to pen and paper. When President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed the nuclear framework, it was signed in an atmosphere of high context – the overall context and trust of the relationship was deemed primary, and the contractual details were deemed secondary.

This approach suited the Indians very well – they are used to operating in high context environments. On the other hand, the Americans, once back in Washington, DC, just to be sure, started to draft the detailed contractual terms. Of course, pressure from lawmakers and opponents of the deal in the U.S. added to the clauses in the fine print, and therefore the low context approach of Americans clashed with the high context approach of the Indians. So, given the propensity of a low context culture to crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s of an agreement, propelled by the opponents of the deal, it is but obvious that such conditions will keep on creeping into the agreement.

The second trend which is lately coming into public view pertains to the fact that several lawmakers are seemingly supportive of the deal, and yet when rubber hits the road, they are not in favor of voting to approve the deal as it is being presented by the U.S. administration. Statements or sound bites like, “I support closer U.S. India relations, and also support civil nuclear cooperation”, that are often reported and understood by many in India as being supportive of the deal, are in fact misleading for those who do not understand American culture. Sure, they are supportive of nuclear cooperation with India, and sure they support President Bush’s pioneering efforts to transform U.S. India relations, but do they support the exact deal which has been presented by the U.S. administration? The answer in many cases is a resounding no. They support nuclear cooperation, but they have concerns or they wish to add certain clauses, or they wish to wait and see what is final draft submitted to the Congress.

The enthusiasm of many proponents of the deal, and the fast paced sound bite driven media cycles miss out on the cultural context in which the statements are being made by U.S. lawmakers. The fine tuned and nuanced communication style of U.S. lawmakers is well understood within the American culture; however it can be very misleading for the Indians. Again, in a high context they are supportive, but when you get down to low contexting the relationship, i.e. spelling the exact details of the relationship, one finds that their opinions are still not made up and the jury is till out.

Relations between the U.S. and India are truly on an inflexion point – a good deal between the two nations has a plethora of dividends for both, though there may be some interests being compromised by both countries. However, a non deal will lead to an altogether different orbit for India in international affairs. Not to say that that orbit will be good or bad for U.S. India relations, but it certainly will be a different path. Anyone who has participated in strategic dialogues between the two countries will tell you that the primary aspect which concerns Indian leadership the most about America is the issue of trust. Trust is the cornerstone of high context cultures. Crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s is the premise of low context cultures. A fusion of the two is now needed.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS: The nuclear deal - The Rubik’s Cube of public diplomacy, and diplomacy in public

That the nuclear deal between the U.S. and India is in trouble is clear from two recent comments. Under Secretary Boucher, in comments to the House International Relations Committee, termed the deal a “real-world pact”, thus implicitly admitting that there is significant opposition from a constituency that believes in an “ideal-world”, and other opponents. On the other hand, Congressman Tom Lantos, has proposed an alternative legislation that is viewed by many observers as a “…legislative option of last resort”, and which, Lantos defends as the most viable solution to salvage the deal.

So, if options of the last resort are being considered, and if the administration is trying to convince the nay-sayers by telling them to “get real”, then what are the pieces in the Rubik’s Cube that need to be better aligned?

The answer may lie in two unrelated but fascinating trends in international affairs – public diplomacy, and diplomacy in public. Hitherto, public diplomacy is generally understood as activities conducted by members of one public or republic, with members of another public or republic. However, the U.S. India nuclear deal has brought to focus another phenomenon in international affairs – diplomacy by governments being conducted in the public sphere. Both of these trends need to be aligned better if the deal has to go through. There are shortcomings in the public diplomacy being conducted by Indian Americans; and, both the U.S. and Indian governments need to do a better job at conducting diplomacy in the public sphere, often via media.

Public diplomacy by the Indian American community and organizations is extensive and efforts are being spent on events, meetings, etc., to bring together Congressmen and Senators, and also administration officials at times. The Indian American community is making the mistake of assuming that a public show of diplomacy suffices to change opinions. The mistake that political activism equates to lobbying. It does not.

A public show of diplomacy alone, by Congressmen and Senators in the events being organized, does nothing for the deal. By mainly spending energies on public events, and not investing adequately in answering opposing arguments, the Indian American community has unwittingly raised the entropy of the debate which has brought out the opponents in full force.

In order to genuinely change opinion, it needs an intellectual basis of policy and research, and education. No lobby in the US can succeed without the engine of think tanks and the Indian American community has vastly underinvested in this area. It is pitted against think tanks that have been around for decades and who have perfected their arguments. The hard work of the community is truly commendable; however the efforts are, pardon the Bush-ism, mis-invested.

The second trend which too needs to be aligned better, is, pardon another Bush-ism, an over-conduct of diplomacy in public. Topics and details of the dialogue between the two nations are in the public domain before one or the other party has had time to even consider, leave alone do a strategic analysis. Traditional statecraft, the post-Westphalia diplomacy, allowed nations to mull and posture in private while strategic negotiations were conducted. No such luxury in the age of liquid international relations.

Both the U.S. and India are fending off pressures from their domestic constituencies who blame them for short selling national interests. Instant reactions are sought by the public on any development, leading to responses that are guided more by instant reflexive posturing, and less by the ability to craft Machiavellian solutions, since such solutions may take time. This trend of diplomacy in public, though constraining the negotiations, is of course nutritive to the DNA of global democracy. This hectic mix of publics, media, and technologies in international affairs is a “real-world” situation.

Despite their best efforts, both the U.S. and Indian governments have been under-prepared to sell the deal in such a “real world”. The education of their publics by the two governments, and by the two lobby firms hired by the government of India, is failing to convince the first lines of public inquiry in the United States – the lawmakers.

A broad view that the U.S. Congress generally goes with the President may not hold true in this case and a non-deal will drastically change the trajectory of U.S. India relations, and more importantly crunch India’s energy needs. There is a real chance that the deal may not go through unless the two governments and their lobbyists better manage their diplomacy in public, and with their publics; and unless the public diplomacy by Indian Americans becomes more effective.