U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS - The Tao of U.S. - India Relations in the 21st Century - Four Urgent Steps Needed Now for a Giant Leap in Global Affairs

New Delhi - There needs to be a wake up call and immediate action by all parties who have any interest in a true handshake of synergies between the U.S. and India. The civil nuclear deal is in the last stages of being framed for posterity, and unless the nine contentious issues, the nine pins standing, are resolved, the whole framework may fall apart.

Though the TAO© (Tasks for Achieving Objectives) for a giant leap in U.S. – India relations are constantly evolving, yet four crucial tasks need immediate and precise action. Indian parliamentarians have objected to nine key clauses contained in the House and Senate versions of the deal. It is critical that the U.S. Senate, House, executive branch, corporate lobbyists, Indian American pressure groups, think tanks, and the media take fuller cognizance of the ground realities in India, and act with urgency, and not get misled by mere “passage of the deal in the Senate”.

Task 1 – Interpreting the message across cultures.

India has matrixed itself into a corner where it almost cannot accept any variation to the July 18 parameters of the nuclear deal, a message that was loud and clear in the speech by the Indian PM to the parliament on August 17 2006, made due to compelling domestic pressures which had been building up ever since July 18 2005.

A failure by the stakeholders to accord due seriousness to the message emanating from Indian democracy may prove disastrous for the fate of the deal. High context cultures like India, where the exact verbal or written words may not be the complete message, seldom articulate a message that is cut and dry like a lawyer’s brief. Such clear cut messages are more a hallmark of low context cultures, like the U.S., where the totality of the message is supposed to be captured by the exact written or verbal word. Indian PM’s speech of August 17 was very low context, since it clearly defines the parameters of U.S. – India civil nuclear cooperation, and does not leave much to imagination.

The message is simple – the Indian executive branch may well be forced to walk away from the deal if the contours of the said deal are pressured beyond the July 18 joint statement. Any and all stakeholders, opinion leaders, and decision makers need to consider this message at its face value.

Task 2 – Ahoy! All hands on deck.

Recognizing the ramifications of the message, it is but necessary for all hands to focus their efforts on resolving the nine contentious issues, rather than diluting their energies in symbolisms. Of course the U.S. executive branch is focused on the nuts and bolts; and of course the paid lobbyists are expected to lob ideas to change specific clauses; however the broader players in public diplomacy comprising of the Indian American community, the think tanks, and several other sympathizers of the deal, are paying inadequate attention to the irritants in the deal. This oversight on the part of broader public diplomacy in not addressing the core and specific issues of disagreement between the U.S. and India may prove to be a costly mistake. Public diplomacy by the commons, and opinion leaders within the commons, has to intervene urgently and intelligently to address the realpolitik of U.S. India relations.

It may be the classic trap of everybody thinking that somebody else is minding the store, and nobody ends up doing the task. At the time of writing this article, it is not even confirmed whether the deal will be scheduled in the legislative calendar of the Senate in the current session, which expires on October 6th. The different layers of lobbying for pragmatic U.S. – India relations have to mesh and ensure that symbolisms, imagery, and the nuts and bolts are aligned to deliver the TAO© of mutual synergies between the oldest and largest democracy on this planet.

Task 3 – Win minor battles. Knock down as many pins now.

There are expectations in many quarters that most, if not all, contentious issues will be addressed at the conference stage. The assumption, rightly so, is that the U.S. administration will have a more relevant role to play at the stage when the final version of the bill is being negotiated between the House and Senate.

However this strategy raises the stakes at the conference stage. It would be far more pragmatic to remove as many barriers to success as possible at the earliest, so that the interlocutors at the conference stage have fewer battles to fight. There are lessons to be learnt from Sun Tzu’s advocacy on the timing and size of battles – victory in war is better assured if you have won the minor battles in time. Why create a mega battle if you have the time, strategy, and ability to win the minor battles?

Lately there have been references to the growing voice of the Indian American community in mainstream America, and comparisons are being made with the clout wielded by the Jewish American community. At this critical juncture the Indian American community needs to take another leaf from Jewish methods – their success more often than not has been due to an acute attention to details, winning minor battles decisively, and averting mega battles.

Thus the task is clear for the proponents, pressure groups, and paid lobbyists of a paradigm shift in U.S. India relations – they should act now to zero in and resolve as many of the nine contentious issues, before the conference.

Task 4 – Recognize and influence the Tao of global affairs.

The concept of Tao is based upon the understanding that the only constant in the universe is change (i.e. I Ching, the “Book of Changes”), and that we must understand and be in harmony with this change. The possibilities of change in U.S. India relations are immense, and these changes will in turn define the Tao of global affairs in the 21st century. Lawmakers and the publics in both the U.S. and India need to recognize and influence this change to the best of their abilities.

Attention to TAO© will yield a better Tao of U.S. India relations and global affairs.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS: Indian PM's Speech of August 17, 2006 - A case study in the common sense of democracy

As India embarks on the 60^th year of her experiment as the largest democracy on this planet, a unique revolution is sweeping across the world, including India. It is a simple revolution – as all true revolutions come. It is a revolution of and about the common sense of democracy within and across cultures, communities, and nations.

The stirrings unleashed by a sense of the commons about what democracy means in each of our own communities, and the methods used to explore a common sense of democracy across and between cultures, will define much of global relations and conflicts in the 21^st millennium, and how you and I sleep at night – and what we wake up to tomorrow.

It truly has been a long time coming – from the Greeks with their sense of democracy which spread as far as the human voice could address a gathering, to the world of today when a voice in the rain forests of the Amazon instantly influences opinion in the city of London; or when words and terminologies used in the U.S. Congress spark instant reactions from Indian lawmakers; and vice versa. Welcome to the era, and challenges, of liquid and cross-pollinated foreign policy and democracy – an era in which democratic nations strive for a sense of relations which is common to them, while struggling to consolidate the will of their commons.

Nothing illustrates this era more vividly than the current tango between the U.S. and Indian legislators on the nuclear deal. The discourse, debates, and definitions used in the U.S. Congress are finding an echo in the remarks, rhetoric, and reaction in the Indian parliament, and there is significant brouhaha in the Indian parliament about the contours of the deal that are being sketched by the U.S. Congress. There are loud and clear voices in the Indian parliament that were demanding a “Sense of the Parliament” resolution on the nuclear deal, and when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rose on August 17, 2006 to make a statement in the Indian Rajya Sabha (Upper House), he was indeed an impresario who needed to orchestrate a sense that is common to the Indian parliament.

The reasons for his statement, offered to the Indian parliament as an alternative to a “Sense of Parliament” resolution, mark a milestone in Indian democracy, and conduct of foreign affairs. The content of the statement too is no less significant – for he has embodied a sense of the Indian parliament, and declared that the July 18 framework is sacrosanct for civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S.; and though left unsaid has clearly implied that India would not sign off on the deal if the final version of bill in U.S. Congress does not conform within the July 18 framework.

Three key trends in Indian democracy, mentioned later in this article, led up to this significant event of August 17. However, the catalyst for this urge in the Indian parliament for a common “sense” was, if one may, none other than Section 2 of H.R. 5682, the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, which begins with a “Sense of the Congress…”. Now, lo behold, if the U.S. House of Representatives could express its sense about the nuclear deal, why couldn’t Indian parliamentarians voice a “Sense of the Parliament…” about their view of the nuclear deal?

So far so good, since a sense of democracy across cultures is a cherished ideal. However such cross-pollination does pose a challenge to the interlocutors on both sides who have to now contend and hope for a clearly defined common sense between the U.S. and Indian legislatures – rather than negotiate solely via traditional statecraft which typically gave the executive branches enough leeway to structure international relations.

The first trend in Indian democracy which contributed to the August 17 statement gathered steam due to the increased awareness of the commons in India about U.S. democracy. The bold and sometimes tortuous steps being taken by the executive branch in both the U.S. and India to build a fundamental level of trust between the largest and the oldest democracy are providing a unique glimpse into American democracy and legislative processes to the Indians; while on the other hand conveying hazy contours of the Indian democratic process to the American lawmakers and general public.

This heightened exposure and cross-learning about each other’s democracy and legislative processes can be said to have begun on July 18 2005, the day the nuclear agreement was inked. Since that date a lot of water has flown down the Potomac and the Yamuna, and a process which started out as a tentative cross-learning has now morphed into a full fledged cross-pollination of legislative processes, wherein legislative practices in one democracy are inspiring legislative mechanics in the other, and August 17 2006 will mark an important date in Indian democracy.

This trend towards achieving a common sense of democracy is further complicated by differing ground rules in the legislative processes of the U.S. and India. The manner in which the executive branch is answerable to the U.S. Congress in the U.S. Presidential system is very different than the relationship between the executive and legislature in the Indian constitution, largely modeled on the British parliamentary system. The global garden of democracy is populated by apples and oranges of differing legislative processes across cultures, and plucking an apple in the U.S. is not the same as picking an orange in India.

However, as Indian lawmakers, especially the opponents of the deal, learn more about the legislative checks and balances in the U.S., the more they are adopting similar techniques to block and tackle the Indian executive branch. When the likes of President Bush, Condi Rice, Nickolas Burns, and Richard Boucher agree with Indian negotiators that there are some clauses in the draft bills that deviate from the framework of the July 18 agreement, and that the U.S. administration will lobby with the Congress to iron out those wrinkles, it sparks a corollary insight in New Delhi – why not ask the Indian executive branch to similarly justify and defend its case in the parliament? The Prime Minister’s statement of August 17 is a demonstrable outcome of this demand of the Indian parliament.

Such remarks by American leaders also have the classic effect of “unintended consequences” beyond the intended objective of reassuring India that the U.S. administration is trying its best to convince the U.S. Congress. The unintended consequences include a further enriching of democracy in the U.S., India, and globally, since the statements by U.S. leaders imply that in a democracy the outcomes are driven by the will of the people – that the executive can at best only make a forceful case before the legislature. The commons, who elect their representatives, are the true arbitrators of the conduct of policy via their elected representatives. Defining policy in their home countries, the commons have now become an emerging force in shaping international relations via their legislators and public diplomacy.

The public display of democratic and legislative processes in the U.S. is a live and ongoing case study which has several lessons both for the U.S. and other democratic societies. In addition, the activism and public diplomacy – a sense of the commons – of the Indian American community did play a certain role in convincing U.S. lawmakers about the rightfulness of the nuclear deal (albeit with its riders that are opposed by the Indian parliament), and the media in India is doing its bit to convey the story to Indians.

The media, the opinion leaders, and the commons in the world’s largest democracy are thus privy to a unique case study of an issue being discussed and wrestled among the commons, opinion leaders, and legislature of the world’s oldest democracy. It will not miss the astute observer that the theatre of legislative and rhetorical sumo playing out in the U.S. has stimulated the imagination of the scriptwriters, artistes, and the commons of Indian democracy.

Meanwhile, Indian democracy, marching onwards to its own manifest destiny is undergoing a renaissance shaped by two major trends – the “panchayats” and the Right to Information Act. These are the two other trends which added up to the event of August 17, 2006. Both of these trends are empowering the commons in an unprecedented manner, and enabling them to express their sense of the India of tomorrow.

India, which can well lay claim to the oldest practice of democracy, even before the Greeks, had a system of grassroots democracy wherein each village had five wise and elected men who guided the affairs of the village – the panchayat. The trend of giving institutional legitimacy within the Indian democracy to these panchayats, which began in the late 1980s, is now gaining real teeth in India, wherein democracy has been devolved down to the village level under Indian law. Slow by slow this is the real revolution in Indian democracy.

It is ironic and interesting that the other cataclysmic force which is now enriching Indian democracy and its commons is something from the information age – the Right to Information Act. Discerning observers are of the view that this Act is even more potent than the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. The commons in India are suddenly finding that they can question and hold accountable their representatives, and more importantly the administration in India.

Thus, a convergence of three factors in India – awareness about U.S. legislative processes; devolution of democracy down to the village levels; and spreading of a right to information – is provoking the commons in India to make sense of their own democracy. PM Singh was responding to these three powerful trends in Indian democracy when he rose to make his statement on August 17, 2006 – his challenge was to build a common sense within the Indian parliament, and to define parameters of commonality with the U.S. Congress

The onus now is on the legislatures in both countries to make common sense of the democracy in each other’s country. If democracy, as Seymour Lipset observed, "requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus", then the emerging revolution spurred by the quest for a common sense of democracy across and between cultures is well on its way to defining our world of tomorrow. Heck, it is defining our world today, and common sense dictates that we cannot do anything other than work harder and be imaginative in order to build a sense of democracy that is common and shared across cultures.