U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - When is a deal a deal? Don't relent and keep working - it is only a bill so far

Language is a funny thing. And on top of it limited space in air or print media often necessitate short phrases which attempt to convey the maximum in the shortest possible time or space. And then the short hand takes on a life of its own and both the masses and the media come to believe that the short hand is the real thing.

As the fate of civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India makes it way through the American legislative processes, it is critical for the lobbyists and supporters, analysts, and general public to keep in mind several points before we conclude that a civil nuclear “deal” has been made between the two countries.

1. The first thing to keep in mind is that the content and conditions of any final bill which is passed by both houses of the U.S. Congress, and then signed into law by President Bush, will then need to be signed off by the Indian government in order to consummate a “deal”. It is only then that the governmental interlocutors and lobbyists can take a well earned vacation, and the media can declare that we do have a deal. Any champagne popping in the interim has to wait.

However, there may be a penultimate stage wherein it could still be said that we do have a “deal”. That will be the stage when the Senate version of the bill (yet to be passed, or may be passed by the time this article appears) is reconciled with the House version of the bill (already passed), and if the reconciled final version of the bill does not have any apparent irritants which may roil the support for the deal in India. This is the stage at which the outcome is the most important for civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India.

2. Laser like focus and attention should be on nature of conditions attached to the finalized bill which emerges from the U.S. Congress. Such attached conditions to the finalized bill are critical for the fate of the bill to either morph into a deal or flounder as a wannabe deal.

A final nuclear cooperation bill from the U.S. Congress will be subject to intense scrutiny in India and measured against the July 18th 2005 framework. Government interlocutors in both countries have been working over time and incessantly to bridge the gaps between what the U.S. Congress could finally demand, and what PM Manmohan Singh committed in his speech to the Indian parliament on August 17th 2006.

As of last analyses, there were nineteen potential amendments that have been touted by lawmakers in the US Senate, and there are nine clear cut objections voiced by Indian parliamentarians. If amongst the amendments incorporated in the Senate, or finalized version of the, bill there are any that fundamentally collide with Indian objections, then the chances of a “deal” are virtually nil. We may have a bill, but we won’t have a deal.
3. There are two broad aspects – ideology and deal-making - that will make or mar the fate of the nuclear bill in the US Congress. The ideological arguments and opposition have to be countered by ideology and rational arguments, plus the larger picture of US-India relations – after all the proposed agreement is about building mature trust between the two democracies as much as it is about energy. The deal making, on the other hand is about give-and-take on Capitol Hill between the U.S. administration and lawmakers, and between lawmakers of different groupings.

There is support in both countries and amongst lawmakers for a ‘deal”, yet the devil lies in the details – it may wear Prada, but it needs both ideology and deal-making to succeed in creating a win-win for all parties concerned. Lobbyists for the government of India, for corporate interests, and those representing the grassroots have been using their arsenals of ideology, political grassroots pressure, personal and institutional relationships, and campaign finance to get sufficient face time with the lawmakers and convince them of the merits of a “deal” with India.

4. Lobbying for the bill has always been two pronged – one, ensuring that the bill comes up for discussions in the legislative chambers at the earliest (foreign relations committees of both houses, then the full House of Representatives, and now in the full Senate); and two, countering the arguments in favor of “deal-breaker” clauses attached to the bill in its various incarnations.

At each stage when the bill has come for discussions in the committees or the full chamber, and passed, a sense of victory has permeated the proponents of a “deal”. Savoring limited victory is good – especially when it keeps the passion and momentum of the proponents in high gear for the next battle. However, declaring victory is immature till the finalized bill has been drafted and the nine Indian versus nineteen American concerns vetted in the language of the bill.

5. And this brings us to the last key point of this article – timing. Haste and chaos are at times useful in befuddling the adversary – the urgency imposed due to the need to pass the final bill within the lame duck session of the Senate may help in scuttling arguments of the opponents, however, on the other hand, a bill that is passed with “deal-breakers”, due to the pressures of time, may be just that – a deal-breaker.

The energies being spent in battling the pressures of time should not take away from the energies required to mitigate and eliminate the contentious clauses from being attached to the bill. Relentless effort and acute attention to detail are required to make a success of this emerging bill – and to then call it a deal.

In the larger picture of things the fate of the bill in the lame duck session does not matter for the lobbyists and friends of deeper, wider, and mature relations between the US and India – they have to work relentlessly to convert the underlying strategic intent of this bill into a win-win relationship between the US and India. A civil nuclear deal between the two countries would be a great start.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS - Its the public, stupid

The Bush administration suffered a loss of public faith in the just concluded U.S. mid-term elections, and now the President must govern with a legislative branch that is controlled by the Democrats. The change in this dynamic will no doubt affect the two remaining years of the Bush presidency. Several factors accentuated the loss for Bush, not the least a historic trend that President’s normally suffer a loss in their sixth year in office – a study shows that on an average Presidents’ have lost 31 seats in the House and 6 seats in the Senate in their sixth year. Bush could not buck the trend.

Impact on U.S. – India relations

Of course, the top concern amongst friends of India is the fate of the U.S. – India nuclear deal. In order not to miss the forest for the trees, the foremost thing to keep in mind is that the nuclear deal is nothing but a surrogate for building trust and a mature understanding between the U.S. and India to face the challenges of their domestic and international interests in a very complicated 21st century.

That being said, the next import of the deal lies in a pair of very urgent and specific needs of both the U.S. and India. India needs the deal for its energy security. India is slated to be the third largest global economy by 2050, behind China, and the U.S., and its ability to lift millions out of poverty depends on its ability to feed its economy with the energy it needs. The U.S. on the other hand needs the deal for protecting and defining its geo-political contours in the 21st century. Especially when the global balance of economic power is shifting to the Asia-Pacific theatre, and when a vibrant democracy of one billion people is providing a stabilizing influence in global affairs.

The challenges to the deal have always been two fold. From the American perspective, it is about not compromising on some principles that relate to nuclear non-proliferation, and set an unprecedented exception for India. The Democrats, for whatsoever reasons, have been more vocal on that record – and the fact that the U.S. administration did not consult in due protocol with the legislative branch miffed several of them - understandably more Democrats felt slighted than Republicans.

On the other hand, from the Indian perspective, amongst those voicing concern at the Prime Minister’s pioneering initiative was a sense of not wanting to lose out on the traditional independence in Indian foreign policy, and not wanting to subject Indian scientific research, and nuclear doctrine, to foreign interferences.

Both the above challenges to the deal are coming from domestic constituencies – it is a matter of public opinion in the U.S. versus public opinion in India.


What will happen now?

What happens now will be no different than what would have happened in a Republican dominated legislature – albeit some more twists in the conditions attached to the bill may be anticipated. And herein is the moot point which is being maybe missed by many while reading the tea leaves. The finalized nuclear bill will pass - either by end of this year (low probability) or some time next year. Once the bill has been passed it will then be presented to India as the conclusive framework in which the U.S. will engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India.

The defining moment will come when India will be presented with the final bill, and its tagged conditions. The operative part – the crucial part – for all interested stakeholders is to focus on these tagged conditions. A legislature dominated by the Democrats may mean that the conditions tagged to the bill are more unpalatable to India. Such a bill, with unpalatable conditions, presented to India will put PM Manmohan Singh in a bind. He has already promised to the Indian parliament certain parameters within which India will engage and do a “deal” with the U.S. The North Korean nuclear test has not helped either – the NPT lobby in Washington, DC has more arguments now, and so do Indian opponents of the deal who argue that the global theatre is too unpredictable for India to compromise on its nuclear option.

Who can do what now?

The Indian American community has been working very hard to build bipartisan bridges over the past few years. Rep. Pelosi, Sen. Reid, Sen. Biden, and Rep. Lantos, are pivotal players now, and along with Rep. Hastert, Sen. Frist, Sen. Lugar, and Sen. Hyde, can be counted to deliver a mature framework – but they all have to be convinced that their public wants a bill with minimal conditions.

The Indian American community has heavily spent its chips – on events, fund-raisers, phone, fax, and e-mail campaigns, personal meetings, etc., and needs some oxygen along with robust efforts by the government of India and corporate lobbyists like the US India Business Council.

Support for deeper relations between the two countries is bipartisan amongst the leaders and the publics of U.S. and India – the devil lies in the details. The public in the U.S. have to be convinced that the conditions tagged to the nuclear bill be minimal and conform to the July 18 framework. After all, the leaders, be they in the U.S. or India, reflect the will of their peoples.

It is public versus public.