U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS - Its the public, stupid
The Bush administration suffered a loss of public faith in the just concluded U.S. mid-term elections, and now the President must govern with a legislative branch that is controlled by the Democrats. The change in this dynamic will no doubt affect the two remaining years of the Bush presidency. Several factors accentuated the loss for Bush, not the least a historic trend that President’s normally suffer a loss in their sixth year in office – a study shows that on an average Presidents’ have lost 31 seats in the House and 6 seats in the Senate in their sixth year. Bush could not buck the trend.
Impact on U.S. – India relations
Of course, the top concern amongst friends of India is the fate of the U.S. – India nuclear deal. In order not to miss the forest for the trees, the foremost thing to keep in mind is that the nuclear deal is nothing but a surrogate for building trust and a mature understanding between the U.S. and India to face the challenges of their domestic and international interests in a very complicated 21st century.
That being said, the next import of the deal lies in a pair of very urgent and specific needs of both the U.S. and India. India needs the deal for its energy security. India is slated to be the third largest global economy by 2050, behind China, and the U.S., and its ability to lift millions out of poverty depends on its ability to feed its economy with the energy it needs. The U.S. on the other hand needs the deal for protecting and defining its geo-political contours in the 21st century. Especially when the global balance of economic power is shifting to the Asia-Pacific theatre, and when a vibrant democracy of one billion people is providing a stabilizing influence in global affairs.
The challenges to the deal have always been two fold. From the American perspective, it is about not compromising on some principles that relate to nuclear non-proliferation, and set an unprecedented exception for India. The Democrats, for whatsoever reasons, have been more vocal on that record – and the fact that the U.S. administration did not consult in due protocol with the legislative branch miffed several of them - understandably more Democrats felt slighted than Republicans.
On the other hand, from the Indian perspective, amongst those voicing concern at the Prime Minister’s pioneering initiative was a sense of not wanting to lose out on the traditional independence in Indian foreign policy, and not wanting to subject Indian scientific research, and nuclear doctrine, to foreign interferences.
Both the above challenges to the deal are coming from domestic constituencies – it is a matter of public opinion in the U.S. versus public opinion in India.
What will happen now?
What happens now will be no different than what would have happened in a Republican dominated legislature – albeit some more twists in the conditions attached to the bill may be anticipated. And herein is the moot point which is being maybe missed by many while reading the tea leaves. The finalized nuclear bill will pass - either by end of this year (low probability) or some time next year. Once the bill has been passed it will then be presented to India as the conclusive framework in which the U.S. will engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India.
The defining moment will come when India will be presented with the final bill, and its tagged conditions. The operative part – the crucial part – for all interested stakeholders is to focus on these tagged conditions. A legislature dominated by the Democrats may mean that the conditions tagged to the bill are more unpalatable to India. Such a bill, with unpalatable conditions, presented to India will put PM Manmohan Singh in a bind. He has already promised to the Indian parliament certain parameters within which India will engage and do a “deal” with the U.S. The North Korean nuclear test has not helped either – the NPT lobby in Washington, DC has more arguments now, and so do Indian opponents of the deal who argue that the global theatre is too unpredictable for India to compromise on its nuclear option.
Who can do what now?
The Indian American community has been working very hard to build bipartisan bridges over the past few years. Rep. Pelosi, Sen. Reid, Sen. Biden, and Rep. Lantos, are pivotal players now, and along with Rep. Hastert, Sen. Frist, Sen. Lugar, and Sen. Hyde, can be counted to deliver a mature framework – but they all have to be convinced that their public wants a bill with minimal conditions.
The Indian American community has heavily spent its chips – on events, fund-raisers, phone, fax, and e-mail campaigns, personal meetings, etc., and needs some oxygen along with robust efforts by the government of India and corporate lobbyists like the US India Business Council.
Support for deeper relations between the two countries is bipartisan amongst the leaders and the publics of U.S. and India – the devil lies in the details. The public in the U.S. have to be convinced that the conditions tagged to the nuclear bill be minimal and conform to the July 18 framework. After all, the leaders, be they in the U.S. or India, reflect the will of their peoples.
It is public versus public.
Impact on U.S. – India relations
Of course, the top concern amongst friends of India is the fate of the U.S. – India nuclear deal. In order not to miss the forest for the trees, the foremost thing to keep in mind is that the nuclear deal is nothing but a surrogate for building trust and a mature understanding between the U.S. and India to face the challenges of their domestic and international interests in a very complicated 21st century.
That being said, the next import of the deal lies in a pair of very urgent and specific needs of both the U.S. and India. India needs the deal for its energy security. India is slated to be the third largest global economy by 2050, behind China, and the U.S., and its ability to lift millions out of poverty depends on its ability to feed its economy with the energy it needs. The U.S. on the other hand needs the deal for protecting and defining its geo-political contours in the 21st century. Especially when the global balance of economic power is shifting to the Asia-Pacific theatre, and when a vibrant democracy of one billion people is providing a stabilizing influence in global affairs.
The challenges to the deal have always been two fold. From the American perspective, it is about not compromising on some principles that relate to nuclear non-proliferation, and set an unprecedented exception for India. The Democrats, for whatsoever reasons, have been more vocal on that record – and the fact that the U.S. administration did not consult in due protocol with the legislative branch miffed several of them - understandably more Democrats felt slighted than Republicans.
On the other hand, from the Indian perspective, amongst those voicing concern at the Prime Minister’s pioneering initiative was a sense of not wanting to lose out on the traditional independence in Indian foreign policy, and not wanting to subject Indian scientific research, and nuclear doctrine, to foreign interferences.
Both the above challenges to the deal are coming from domestic constituencies – it is a matter of public opinion in the U.S. versus public opinion in India.
What will happen now?
What happens now will be no different than what would have happened in a Republican dominated legislature – albeit some more twists in the conditions attached to the bill may be anticipated. And herein is the moot point which is being maybe missed by many while reading the tea leaves. The finalized nuclear bill will pass - either by end of this year (low probability) or some time next year. Once the bill has been passed it will then be presented to India as the conclusive framework in which the U.S. will engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India.
The defining moment will come when India will be presented with the final bill, and its tagged conditions. The operative part – the crucial part – for all interested stakeholders is to focus on these tagged conditions. A legislature dominated by the Democrats may mean that the conditions tagged to the bill are more unpalatable to India. Such a bill, with unpalatable conditions, presented to India will put PM Manmohan Singh in a bind. He has already promised to the Indian parliament certain parameters within which India will engage and do a “deal” with the U.S. The North Korean nuclear test has not helped either – the NPT lobby in Washington, DC has more arguments now, and so do Indian opponents of the deal who argue that the global theatre is too unpredictable for India to compromise on its nuclear option.
Who can do what now?
The Indian American community has been working very hard to build bipartisan bridges over the past few years. Rep. Pelosi, Sen. Reid, Sen. Biden, and Rep. Lantos, are pivotal players now, and along with Rep. Hastert, Sen. Frist, Sen. Lugar, and Sen. Hyde, can be counted to deliver a mature framework – but they all have to be convinced that their public wants a bill with minimal conditions.
The Indian American community has heavily spent its chips – on events, fund-raisers, phone, fax, and e-mail campaigns, personal meetings, etc., and needs some oxygen along with robust efforts by the government of India and corporate lobbyists like the US India Business Council.
Support for deeper relations between the two countries is bipartisan amongst the leaders and the publics of U.S. and India – the devil lies in the details. The public in the U.S. have to be convinced that the conditions tagged to the nuclear bill be minimal and conform to the July 18 framework. After all, the leaders, be they in the U.S. or India, reflect the will of their peoples.
It is public versus public.
posted by Robinder Sachdev at 4:33 PM
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