There are two key issues which have cropped up in this past couple of days that merit a better understanding of the calculus of the negotiations that are going on to consummate the civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Both of these issues must be examined with the lens of cross-cultural communications to explain such baffling developments.
The first issue is the question of why the Americans are adding conditions after conditions to the deal, which supposedly has been agreed to between the two governments at the highest levels? The second issue is why several lawmakers in the U.S. are seemingly supportive of the deal, yet there is no action on the ground by them? A large part of the answer to both these questions lies in cross-cultural communications.
Let us first deal with the seeming propensity of American interlocutors to add conditions to the deal even while India keeps fending off such amendments or additions. The latest spanner in the works is the insistence by American interlocutors that India should return any material or equipment acquired under the deal if either side terminates the deal or is perceived to be in violation of the letter or spirit of the agreement for cooperation in civil nuclear energy. The diplomacy in public, and public diplomacy, over the next few days on this issue can be well forecast – bowing to its domestic constituencies, India will need to publicly reject such a proposal, and the State Department will most probably have to go back to the drawing board.
Such a tango on several propositions between the U.S. and India has already played out often in the public sphere, and one can safely hazard a guess that this latest proposal too will meet a similar fate. Remember the brouhaha about the 123 agreement a few weeks ago? Once it became known that the American interlocutors were keen on including that as one of the conditions of the deal, India’s response was an immediate and reflexive public denial and rejection. So, why are such conditions being added to the deal on an ongoing basis?
The U.S. is traditionally a “low context” culture, whereas India is typically a “high context” culture. A low context culture assumes no context to any relationship, and safeguards itself by spelling out each and every term of the relationship on paper. High context cultures, on the other hand, assume that there is a significant context and trust to the relationship, and therefore do not reduce the complete understanding to pen and paper. When President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed the nuclear framework, it was signed in an atmosphere of high context – the overall context and trust of the relationship was deemed primary, and the contractual details were deemed secondary.
This approach suited the Indians very well – they are used to operating in high context environments. On the other hand, the Americans, once back in Washington, DC, just to be sure, started to draft the detailed contractual terms. Of course, pressure from lawmakers and opponents of the deal in the U.S. added to the clauses in the fine print, and therefore the low context approach of Americans clashed with the high context approach of the Indians. So, given the propensity of a low context culture to crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s of an agreement, propelled by the opponents of the deal, it is but obvious that such conditions will keep on creeping into the agreement.
The second trend which is lately coming into public view pertains to the fact that several lawmakers are seemingly supportive of the deal, and yet when rubber hits the road, they are not in favor of voting to approve the deal as it is being presented by the U.S. administration. Statements or sound bites like, “I support closer U.S. India relations, and also support civil nuclear cooperation”, that are often reported and understood by many in India as being supportive of the deal, are in fact misleading for those who do not understand American culture. Sure, they are supportive of nuclear cooperation with India, and sure they support President Bush’s pioneering efforts to transform U.S. India relations, but do they support the exact deal which has been presented by the U.S. administration? The answer in many cases is a resounding no. They support nuclear cooperation, but they have concerns or they wish to add certain clauses, or they wish to wait and see what is final draft submitted to the Congress.
The enthusiasm of many proponents of the deal, and the fast paced sound bite driven media cycles miss out on the cultural context in which the statements are being made by U.S. lawmakers. The fine tuned and nuanced communication style of U.S. lawmakers is well understood within the American culture; however it can be very misleading for the Indians. Again, in a high context they are supportive, but when you get down to low contexting the relationship, i.e. spelling the exact details of the relationship, one finds that their opinions are still not made up and the jury is till out.
Relations between the U.S. and India are truly on an inflexion point – a good deal between the two nations has a plethora of dividends for both, though there may be some interests being compromised by both countries. However, a non deal will lead to an altogether different orbit for India in international affairs. Not to say that that orbit will be good or bad for U.S. India relations, but it certainly will be a different path. Anyone who has participated in strategic dialogues between the two countries will tell you that the primary aspect which concerns Indian leadership the most about America is the issue of trust. Trust is the cornerstone of high context cultures. Crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s is the premise of low context cultures. A fusion of the two is now needed.
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