U.S. INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL -The Deal is Dead – Long Live the Deal. Inoculating the leaderships, lobbyists, and publics in the U.S. and India

Much like the philosophy in the slogan, the King is dead – long live the King, wherein the death of the incumbent king does not mean the end of the monarchy, similarly an inglorious death of the U.S. – India civil nuclear deal will not mean the end of U.S. – India relations.

However, a dead nuclear deal will have an enormous impact on future engagements between the U.S., India, and globally – with the most fundamental aspect being that future relations between the U.S. and India will be guided more by economics, and less by politics. If the U.S. and India are to have at least a partial political partnership in the 21^st century, then the only way ahead is a “middle path” on the nuclear deal, as articulated by India’s foreign minister, or a paradigm for “atoms for peace and trust” as recently argued by this column.

And herein lays the reason for inoculating the leaderships, opinion making elites, and publics, of both countries that the deal may be dead – for this partial political partnership may be hanging by a fine thread.

What is Inoculation, and its Need

Inoculation theory, developed after the U.S. army discovered that U.S. soldiers who were taken prisoner by the North Koreans during the Korean War, could not defend their political and social beliefs when subject to the North’s propaganda, is a simple exercise that gives a small dose of negative information to the subject, so that the subject’s psychological defenses are then able to ward off a larger dose of negative information at a later stage. U.S. soldiers who had never known of any shortcomings in their own country’s political and social systems were taken by shock when the North Korean captors brainwashed them about the fallacies in their own home country. Their worldview shattered, many of them committed what was perceived as “treason” in the United States.

To counter this psychological warfare, American soldiers were thus given lessons in the shortcomings of American democracy before they were sent to the Korean War – somewhat like the vaccine shots given to children, so that later in life their body can withstand a bigger, more virulent attack by the same virus.

It is high time now for us to similarly inoculate the leaderships and publics in both the U.S. and India, so that we all know where we are headed. In addition to the risk of losing a partial political partnership with India; at stake is also the business opportunity for U.S. firms in India. Similarly, for India, a non-deal will severely constrain its energy plans for the next decades, plus it will lose out on the strategic benefits of a partial political partnership with the U.S., which include acceleration in foreign investments, and possibly hurt its chances in world bodies like the UN Security Council.

The Marxist Basis of Relations

Continuing with the dosage of our inoculation, it is now important to understand the nature of U.S. – India relations minus the nuclear deal. Of course, as mentioned earlier it will mean that the partial political partnership in 21^st century will be cast aside, and, furthermore, it shall mean that future U.S. – India relations will be very much based upon cold economic calculations. Therefore the prism to view bilateral relations, and global affairs, will be very much dominated by a strategic economic calculus between the two nations, rather than a strategic political calculus.

Thus, an analogy from Marx’s scientific explanation of society – wherein he espoused that the base of any society is economics, and that the superstructure forces of the society reflect the economic base – may well come to define the state of U.S. – India relations in the 21^st century. In fact, the economic basis of relations is already defining the contours of the nuclear deal – for the deal has run into rough weather only because of India’s nuclear economics. The irony is that if both countries overcome the hurdle of India’s nuclear economics, then they are set on a path of partial political partnership; and if they do not then again economics will be the base of any and all U.S.-India relations.

The Road Ahead

Thinking of the road ahead, it behooves us to inoculate leaderships and the lobbyists in the U.S. that the road ahead may require investment of political and relationship capital in order to convince U.S. lawmakers about the need for Atoms for Peace and Trust between the U.S. and India. The Indian American community and corporate lobbyists, who virtually since December 2006 are assuming that the deal is done, and that their jobs are over, need to gird up for the task ahead.

The NPT lobby needs a hard and clear reply from friends of India who should emphasize how India has lost out to China and compromised its global geo-position over the past half century – all because India adhered to Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace. In addition to fortifying President Bush’s position and rallying the Republican leaderships, the lobbyists need to urgently reach out to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senator Hilary Clinton, Senator Joe Biden, Rep. Tom Lantos, and other Democrat leaders.

In this last lap of efforts, hopefully we shall not make the mistake made while lobbying for the Hyde Act – where many of us missed the attention required to the details, mostly because we did not have enough resources to analyze the fine print sufficiently. Luckily, now the core issues have been distilled very clearly and the economics is very clear, which makes it easier to make concise arguments – thus every occasion can be maximized by using the minimum time. The deal is not dead. Long live the deal.