U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS: The nuclear deal - Tango of pragmatic expectations, or the Francization of India?
Three key events in the past five days have suddenly enmeshed India’s diplomatic and geo-political maneuverings in its quest for energy security. How India navigates these contours will determine India’s positioning in the emerging global order.
First came the remarks of Rep. Tom Lantos at a briefing in the US Congress on US-India civil nuclear cooperation, which drew an equally sharp reaction from the Indian establishment. While it does not serve much purpose to analyze the Lantos-India exchange, what does merit attention is his base argument. Lantos’s underlying observation does reflect the sense of several members of the US Congress who believe that India should look at global affairs through the same prism as they do, in a quid pro quo for the nuclear cooperation offered by the US.
Though Lantos had raised the issue with respect to India’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program, the larger message is beyond the Iranian issue. The job is well cut out for the US and Indian interlocutors to calibrate and convey these expectations to their respective legislators – both in the US and India. Political rhetoric both in the US and India will often push the envelopes of what the interlocutors may rationally design as a win-win relationship, and it is essential that the expectations be set so as to be pragmatic in, and for, both the countries.
Next came the declaration from Pakistan regarding the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. By making an offer to jettison the IPI pipeline in exchange for civil nuclear cooperation with the US, Pakistan has inserted a degree of uncertainty for the Indian game plan to tap Iranian gas. On the upside, Pakistan’s gambit is a smart move in the field of international relations and power politics between nations. Just when India is negotiating with the US while simultaneously maintaining a balancing act with Iran, Pakistan has pulled the rug from below India.
The downside of Pakistan’s gambit is that it has exposed its hand. Common sense would dictate that consequent to this “rug-pulling-experience” India will insist on far stricter and all-purpose guarantees if the IPI pipeline does go through. Since the bar for implementing the IPI pipeline has been raised, the parties will have to have real and sincere mutual commitments if they decide to proceed with the project. Given the fact that the chances of the US agreeing to provide civil nuclear fuel and reactors to Pakistan are quite low, and given the 50/50 chance of the IPI pipeline being built, Pakistan has unwittingly ensured that if the IPI project is implemented then its geo-political impact will enmesh Iran, Pakistan, and India even tighter.
The third key event was the message, particularly on civil nuclear cooperation, emanating from Paris after the talks which PM Singh had with the French leadership. The strong support from the French for India’s civil nuclear program provides succor to India in its quest to feed its booming economy’s voracious appetite for energy. The horizons of French cooperation was captured tellingly in a remark by the Indian Foreign Secretary, "I think that whether it was with the U.S. or with the French, the general sense is that the sooner we move in this direction, the better it is". The French have nuclear technology at par with the U.S., and are in fact far ahead on the learning curve when it comes to harnessing nuclear energy for civil use. The unasked question which begs an answer is, can the French step in to fill the void for fuel-supply, and then technology, if the Congressional approvals get delayed or mired in discussions on Capitol Hill?
In any case the French will be strong competitors of the U.S. when India’s procurement process starts, and by giving this window to the French, the U.S. is reducing its early-mover advantage. In case the Congressional approvals are not forthcoming, and the French are able to provide the fuel, then the strategic leverage which the U.S. is maneuvering, and especially the expectations of the likes of Lantos – that India wear the same glasses as the U.S. while looking at international hot-spots – will be significantly diluted.
Interestingly, the nuclear issue may have brought to the fore a larger question regarding India’s evolution as a practitioner of realpolitik, as well as the inherent ethos of the Indian state – will India become another “France” in global affairs?
The similarities are quite striking – a fierce streak of independence in international relations, a strong emphasis on multi-polarity, and a proclivity towards a welfare state. On the other hand, a strong sense of capitalism in India’s burgeoning middle class and India’s unique demographics – the energy and aspirations of 500 million people under the age of 25 – are factors which may pressure the pendulum towards the U.S.
Now with French nuclear cooperation on the cards, the question of India’s Francization takes on a deeper meaning and into the realm of realpolitik. Whether Indian international relations ends up more as the French variant, or are a tango of pragmatic expectations between the U.S. and India, will depend to an extent on the message which emanates from the U.S. Congress regarding the civil nuclear cooperation.
Ironically, the three events of the past week have served to spur the scope on both counts. The U.S. administration, U.S. Congress, and India realize that they have to strive harder to build mutual trust and pragmatic expectations; while on the other hand India and France have elevated the diplomatic savoir faire towards the Francization of India.
First came the remarks of Rep. Tom Lantos at a briefing in the US Congress on US-India civil nuclear cooperation, which drew an equally sharp reaction from the Indian establishment. While it does not serve much purpose to analyze the Lantos-India exchange, what does merit attention is his base argument. Lantos’s underlying observation does reflect the sense of several members of the US Congress who believe that India should look at global affairs through the same prism as they do, in a quid pro quo for the nuclear cooperation offered by the US.
Though Lantos had raised the issue with respect to India’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program, the larger message is beyond the Iranian issue. The job is well cut out for the US and Indian interlocutors to calibrate and convey these expectations to their respective legislators – both in the US and India. Political rhetoric both in the US and India will often push the envelopes of what the interlocutors may rationally design as a win-win relationship, and it is essential that the expectations be set so as to be pragmatic in, and for, both the countries.
Next came the declaration from Pakistan regarding the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. By making an offer to jettison the IPI pipeline in exchange for civil nuclear cooperation with the US, Pakistan has inserted a degree of uncertainty for the Indian game plan to tap Iranian gas. On the upside, Pakistan’s gambit is a smart move in the field of international relations and power politics between nations. Just when India is negotiating with the US while simultaneously maintaining a balancing act with Iran, Pakistan has pulled the rug from below India.
The downside of Pakistan’s gambit is that it has exposed its hand. Common sense would dictate that consequent to this “rug-pulling-experience” India will insist on far stricter and all-purpose guarantees if the IPI pipeline does go through. Since the bar for implementing the IPI pipeline has been raised, the parties will have to have real and sincere mutual commitments if they decide to proceed with the project. Given the fact that the chances of the US agreeing to provide civil nuclear fuel and reactors to Pakistan are quite low, and given the 50/50 chance of the IPI pipeline being built, Pakistan has unwittingly ensured that if the IPI project is implemented then its geo-political impact will enmesh Iran, Pakistan, and India even tighter.
The third key event was the message, particularly on civil nuclear cooperation, emanating from Paris after the talks which PM Singh had with the French leadership. The strong support from the French for India’s civil nuclear program provides succor to India in its quest to feed its booming economy’s voracious appetite for energy. The horizons of French cooperation was captured tellingly in a remark by the Indian Foreign Secretary, "I think that whether it was with the U.S. or with the French, the general sense is that the sooner we move in this direction, the better it is". The French have nuclear technology at par with the U.S., and are in fact far ahead on the learning curve when it comes to harnessing nuclear energy for civil use. The unasked question which begs an answer is, can the French step in to fill the void for fuel-supply, and then technology, if the Congressional approvals get delayed or mired in discussions on Capitol Hill?
In any case the French will be strong competitors of the U.S. when India’s procurement process starts, and by giving this window to the French, the U.S. is reducing its early-mover advantage. In case the Congressional approvals are not forthcoming, and the French are able to provide the fuel, then the strategic leverage which the U.S. is maneuvering, and especially the expectations of the likes of Lantos – that India wear the same glasses as the U.S. while looking at international hot-spots – will be significantly diluted.
Interestingly, the nuclear issue may have brought to the fore a larger question regarding India’s evolution as a practitioner of realpolitik, as well as the inherent ethos of the Indian state – will India become another “France” in global affairs?
The similarities are quite striking – a fierce streak of independence in international relations, a strong emphasis on multi-polarity, and a proclivity towards a welfare state. On the other hand, a strong sense of capitalism in India’s burgeoning middle class and India’s unique demographics – the energy and aspirations of 500 million people under the age of 25 – are factors which may pressure the pendulum towards the U.S.
Now with French nuclear cooperation on the cards, the question of India’s Francization takes on a deeper meaning and into the realm of realpolitik. Whether Indian international relations ends up more as the French variant, or are a tango of pragmatic expectations between the U.S. and India, will depend to an extent on the message which emanates from the U.S. Congress regarding the civil nuclear cooperation.
Ironically, the three events of the past week have served to spur the scope on both counts. The U.S. administration, U.S. Congress, and India realize that they have to strive harder to build mutual trust and pragmatic expectations; while on the other hand India and France have elevated the diplomatic savoir faire towards the Francization of India.
posted by Robinder Sachdev at 12:41 AM
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