U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS: The nuclear deal - The Rubik’s Cube of public diplomacy, and diplomacy in public

That the nuclear deal between the U.S. and India is in trouble is clear from two recent comments. Under Secretary Boucher, in comments to the House International Relations Committee, termed the deal a “real-world pact”, thus implicitly admitting that there is significant opposition from a constituency that believes in an “ideal-world”, and other opponents. On the other hand, Congressman Tom Lantos, has proposed an alternative legislation that is viewed by many observers as a “…legislative option of last resort”, and which, Lantos defends as the most viable solution to salvage the deal.

So, if options of the last resort are being considered, and if the administration is trying to convince the nay-sayers by telling them to “get real”, then what are the pieces in the Rubik’s Cube that need to be better aligned?

The answer may lie in two unrelated but fascinating trends in international affairs – public diplomacy, and diplomacy in public. Hitherto, public diplomacy is generally understood as activities conducted by members of one public or republic, with members of another public or republic. However, the U.S. India nuclear deal has brought to focus another phenomenon in international affairs – diplomacy by governments being conducted in the public sphere. Both of these trends need to be aligned better if the deal has to go through. There are shortcomings in the public diplomacy being conducted by Indian Americans; and, both the U.S. and Indian governments need to do a better job at conducting diplomacy in the public sphere, often via media.

Public diplomacy by the Indian American community and organizations is extensive and efforts are being spent on events, meetings, etc., to bring together Congressmen and Senators, and also administration officials at times. The Indian American community is making the mistake of assuming that a public show of diplomacy suffices to change opinions. The mistake that political activism equates to lobbying. It does not.

A public show of diplomacy alone, by Congressmen and Senators in the events being organized, does nothing for the deal. By mainly spending energies on public events, and not investing adequately in answering opposing arguments, the Indian American community has unwittingly raised the entropy of the debate which has brought out the opponents in full force.

In order to genuinely change opinion, it needs an intellectual basis of policy and research, and education. No lobby in the US can succeed without the engine of think tanks and the Indian American community has vastly underinvested in this area. It is pitted against think tanks that have been around for decades and who have perfected their arguments. The hard work of the community is truly commendable; however the efforts are, pardon the Bush-ism, mis-invested.

The second trend which too needs to be aligned better, is, pardon another Bush-ism, an over-conduct of diplomacy in public. Topics and details of the dialogue between the two nations are in the public domain before one or the other party has had time to even consider, leave alone do a strategic analysis. Traditional statecraft, the post-Westphalia diplomacy, allowed nations to mull and posture in private while strategic negotiations were conducted. No such luxury in the age of liquid international relations.

Both the U.S. and India are fending off pressures from their domestic constituencies who blame them for short selling national interests. Instant reactions are sought by the public on any development, leading to responses that are guided more by instant reflexive posturing, and less by the ability to craft Machiavellian solutions, since such solutions may take time. This trend of diplomacy in public, though constraining the negotiations, is of course nutritive to the DNA of global democracy. This hectic mix of publics, media, and technologies in international affairs is a “real-world” situation.

Despite their best efforts, both the U.S. and Indian governments have been under-prepared to sell the deal in such a “real world”. The education of their publics by the two governments, and by the two lobby firms hired by the government of India, is failing to convince the first lines of public inquiry in the United States – the lawmakers.

A broad view that the U.S. Congress generally goes with the President may not hold true in this case and a non-deal will drastically change the trajectory of U.S. India relations, and more importantly crunch India’s energy needs. There is a real chance that the deal may not go through unless the two governments and their lobbyists better manage their diplomacy in public, and with their publics; and unless the public diplomacy by Indian Americans becomes more effective.