U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - Twist in the tale?

The cautious and coordinated release of information regarding the final draft of civil nuclear agreement between the US and India has the leaderships, lobbyists, analysts, and media in both countries in a tizzy for the past one week. As the discussions on atoms for peace and trust between the two countries proceed in coming months, three sequential steps will play out – viz., informal political approval in India; formal approval by U.S. Congress; and, lastly lifting of sanctions on India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Each of these steps, though surmountable, comes with its typical nuance.

A historic deal that will significantly impact the world order in 21^st century – not immediately, but in incremental steps over time – the 123 agreement is yet in its birth pangs. The fast paced developments of last week, have however thrown up some very intriguing aspects – and this article attempts a speculative approach to the core issue of sanctions on India in case it tests a device in the future.

As of now, under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, and the Hyde Act, there is no way that India can avoid sanctions if it conducts a test in the future. Sanctions will imply a cut-off of future cooperation, as well as the U.S. administration will be required to demand return of materials which are of U.S. origin. In such a scenario, how can the Indian government square with its people that its investment of billions of dollars, and energy supplies, will not be jeopardized if India conducts a test in future?

The Right-sourcing Strategy

The answer may lie in a simple but imaginative right-sourcing strategy – do not procure materials and equipment from the U.S. If India does not buy equipments and fuel from U.S. suppliers, then its investments and energy security are not dependent on any U.S. action subsequent to a test in the future. By procuring its supplies from countries other than the United States, India will insulate itself from the downside of U.S. sanctions, return of materials, and such.

In the absence of any other compelling rationale by the government of India to assure that its investments will not be prejudiced in the future, right-sourcing seems to be the only mechanism that will enable informal political approval of the 123 deal in India. Such a strategy to deepen strategic relations with the United States, yet not be dependent on U.S. supplies, will also dovetail neatly into India’s strategic worldview where it sees an emerging balance of powers in the global order of 21^st century.

The U.S. government may well be aware of this strategy, and its willingness to sacrifice narrow commercial interest of one particular industry in order to obtain a broader political and economic partnership with India may be unique in annals of American history, and speaks of the vision and stakes at hand.

In a world where the United States is faced with a mercurial Russia, an inscrutable China, the worldwide seepage of Islamic terror, and a schizophrenic and tottering Pakistan, there is simply no other nation with India’s size and democratic ethos to counterbalance the myriad challenges of the 21^st century. The overriding strategic context of the relationship with India is compelling enough for the U.S. administration to term the 123 deal as a matter of “national interest”.

The calculus for India

The Indian parliament is expected to discuss the nuts and bolts of the 123 agreement on the 13^th of August. With the issue of reprocessing seemingly resolved to mutual satisfaction, the only other issue of substance on which the right wing opposition, the government’s communist allies, and many amongst its own party, will zero in, will be the hypothesis of a nuclear test in future. A failure on the part of the government to satisfy the naysayers on this count will be disastrous since the issue can snowball with political and nationalist rhetoric.

The only way out for the Indian government to declare that it has not compromised its sovereign right to test, may then require it to articulate the above said right-sourcing strategy and thereby win their support for the deal. Once out of the dog-house, India can then mitigate its risk of U.S. sanctions by sourcing its fuel and equipments from nations other than the United States. Moreover it may look only at fuel supplies in the first instance, and source the equipments as and when needed.

As Robert Kennedy once famously said, one-fifth of the people are against everything all the time, but if more than that oppose the deal in India, then the government may have to spell out its right-sourcing strategy. Such a strategy also insulates Indian foreign policy from unforeseen pressures in future to align with U.S. on matters where it may hold divergent views. Successful passage of the 123 deal will catalyze unprecedented growth in strategic and economic relations between the two countries, while at the same time India will not be encumbered by a dependency which can influence its independent foreign policy.

The economics for Corporate America

There is no doubt that American business has been one of the main forces in favor of the deal, and India’s adoption of such a right-sourcing strategy might kick off a storm in corporate America. Such a response will be myopic, for, if the speculation is sound, then it is only the nuclear industry that may lose out, while the sum total benefit to all other industries from a newer paradigm of U.S.-India relations will easily outweigh the loss to American nuclear industry.

If, on the other hand, the government of India is not able to defend its case in the Indian parliament, then the whole deal may be off. Thus the economics for corporate America boils down to this – is it better to have a deal which would provide a major boost for American business in India, albeit without participation of American nuclear industry; or have no deal at all? This is not to say that the nuclear industry will completely miss the boat, for it can innovate and be a player in the Indian market – perhaps something like the Japanese nuclear industry which has structured so as to overcome its domestic compulsions, and still is a serious player in world markets.

Beyond the economic calculus, the 21^st century demands an overarching strategic calculus between nations – for how will the global markets thrive and entrepreneurs profit unless there is security and freedom in the markets? The 123 deal between the U.S. and India is a bold attempt to create a paradigm that will help peace in our homes, and ensure a more benign scenario for American, Indian, and other businesses to operate in free markets globally.

The era of atoms for peace is over – now it is about atoms for peace and trust.

U.S. SOCIETY - Dollars and Scents – the flowering of ethnics

On July 2, 2007, just weeks after announcing that they were ready to accept employment based visa applications from hundreds of thousands of legal immigrant professionals, many of whom have been waiting for years, the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) did a volte face and announced that their applications will not be entertained till further notice.

Voila, what else do you expect after this, but thousands of very disappointed professionals? And how do they express their utter frustration at this emotional roller coaster, and with the over 250 million US dollars that they pumped into the U.S. economy in various application costs and the medical expenses, legal fees, etc.? Well, they do so by taking the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi to the doorsteps of U.S. administration.

While mainstream America goes on with its business as usual, there is a refreshing whiff of diversity in its politics that is now blowing from the ethnics and enriching mainstream politics. A literal experience of this fragrance reached Emilio Gonzalez, the director of the USCIS, when his office in Washington, DC received flower bouquets by the hundreds on July 10^th, in a unique protest by the many affected in this flip flop by his department.

Gandhigiri and Reverse Gandhigiri

However, this Gandhigiri of legal immigrants was brilliantly countered by reverse Gandhigiri from the Director of USCIS, who issued a statement, saying, “I understand that individuals are planning to send flowers to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) beginning on Tuesday, July 10. USCIS has made arrangements to forward those flowers to our injured service members recuperating at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and at Bethesda Naval Hospital.” So it seems that USCIS too was inspired by Gandhi in saving its face and deflecting the onslaught of flower power.

This phenomenon is a unique display of cross-pollination of democratic thought across cultures wherein ideas rooted in the principles of Mahatma Gandhi, who led a life that exemplified the power of righteousness and its ultimate triumph, and shook an empire with his unique and non-violent protests, are being used to register a protest in a foreign culture in the 21^st century. And the target of protests too is using Gandhian principles to minimize damage – certainly a radical difference in a culture where lawsuits are the first recourse to any dispute.

This example of democratic innovation from an ethnic community in the U.S., for this protest is being led mainly by people of Indian origin, comes close on the heels of another milestone in mainstream American politics – the Indian American community contributed over three million dollars to Sen. Hilary Clinton’s campaign in last month, alone.

Dollars and Scents

The power of ideas is the oxygen of any democracy, and over the centuries the United States has vigorously nurtured an environment that fosters the flowering of democratic debate. Participation in this debate has often meant that interest groups coalesce to influence public policy – and more often than not, the mother’s milk of politics has been campaign finance.

When added to the fund raisers for other Democratic and Republican presidential candidates, June and July of 2007 will go down as historic months in which the Indian American community contributed the highest amount to presidential races; and brought the fragrance of Gandhian thought to mainstream America. This is a historic summer in which ethnics have contributed unprecedented dollars and ideas to American politics.

This globalized, multicultural, interconnected world is not a cliché – it is a reality, and the reality is hitting home with its dollars and scents. Political presidential candidates ranging from Senator Clinton to potentials like Newt Gingrich need to smell the coffee, or might we say flowers? While the contribution of dollars is very important, yet the thinking elite of America should take a few minutes to absorb and benefit from the power of democratic ideas too which are seeping into American polity by virtue of the presence of ethnics. These ethnics are bringing not only the familiar dollars and cents, but also newer forms of democratic messaging into American politics.

The ethnics bring not only their wallets to the fund raisers, but also their cultural prisms into American politics. The smart candidate goes not after their dollars, but seeks creativity and newer forms of democratic thought which could enrich American society and global communities. Ideas from ethnics may at times provide an innovative break from the groupthink of mainstream politics – in addition to spending millions of dollars on research on foreign policy, and hundreds of hours on foreign trips to understand foreign cultures, it may well benefit American leaderships to leverage the presence of ethnics in their own backyard.

Images and imagination flow across borders, and in the case of India, the much talked about film industry has at last produced a symbol that has inspired action in a foreign culture. Little did Emilio Gonzalez know that the hundreds of bouquets on his desk owed their origins to an India film, “Laage Raho Munna Bhai” – well now he surely does. The film, a spoof on the life and principles of Mahatma Gandhi, and advocating a funny bone approach to societal protest, has struck a chord amongst millions in India, and now is enriching American democracy by inspiring this unique protest.

Dollars in political contributions and the scents of ideas inspired by Gandhi – the ethnics are making sense in American politics.

U.S. INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL -The Deal is Dead – Long Live the Deal. Inoculating the leaderships, lobbyists, and publics in the U.S. and India

Much like the philosophy in the slogan, the King is dead – long live the King, wherein the death of the incumbent king does not mean the end of the monarchy, similarly an inglorious death of the U.S. – India civil nuclear deal will not mean the end of U.S. – India relations.

However, a dead nuclear deal will have an enormous impact on future engagements between the U.S., India, and globally – with the most fundamental aspect being that future relations between the U.S. and India will be guided more by economics, and less by politics. If the U.S. and India are to have at least a partial political partnership in the 21^st century, then the only way ahead is a “middle path” on the nuclear deal, as articulated by India’s foreign minister, or a paradigm for “atoms for peace and trust” as recently argued by this column.

And herein lays the reason for inoculating the leaderships, opinion making elites, and publics, of both countries that the deal may be dead – for this partial political partnership may be hanging by a fine thread.

What is Inoculation, and its Need

Inoculation theory, developed after the U.S. army discovered that U.S. soldiers who were taken prisoner by the North Koreans during the Korean War, could not defend their political and social beliefs when subject to the North’s propaganda, is a simple exercise that gives a small dose of negative information to the subject, so that the subject’s psychological defenses are then able to ward off a larger dose of negative information at a later stage. U.S. soldiers who had never known of any shortcomings in their own country’s political and social systems were taken by shock when the North Korean captors brainwashed them about the fallacies in their own home country. Their worldview shattered, many of them committed what was perceived as “treason” in the United States.

To counter this psychological warfare, American soldiers were thus given lessons in the shortcomings of American democracy before they were sent to the Korean War – somewhat like the vaccine shots given to children, so that later in life their body can withstand a bigger, more virulent attack by the same virus.

It is high time now for us to similarly inoculate the leaderships and publics in both the U.S. and India, so that we all know where we are headed. In addition to the risk of losing a partial political partnership with India; at stake is also the business opportunity for U.S. firms in India. Similarly, for India, a non-deal will severely constrain its energy plans for the next decades, plus it will lose out on the strategic benefits of a partial political partnership with the U.S., which include acceleration in foreign investments, and possibly hurt its chances in world bodies like the UN Security Council.

The Marxist Basis of Relations

Continuing with the dosage of our inoculation, it is now important to understand the nature of U.S. – India relations minus the nuclear deal. Of course, as mentioned earlier it will mean that the partial political partnership in 21^st century will be cast aside, and, furthermore, it shall mean that future U.S. – India relations will be very much based upon cold economic calculations. Therefore the prism to view bilateral relations, and global affairs, will be very much dominated by a strategic economic calculus between the two nations, rather than a strategic political calculus.

Thus, an analogy from Marx’s scientific explanation of society – wherein he espoused that the base of any society is economics, and that the superstructure forces of the society reflect the economic base – may well come to define the state of U.S. – India relations in the 21^st century. In fact, the economic basis of relations is already defining the contours of the nuclear deal – for the deal has run into rough weather only because of India’s nuclear economics. The irony is that if both countries overcome the hurdle of India’s nuclear economics, then they are set on a path of partial political partnership; and if they do not then again economics will be the base of any and all U.S.-India relations.

The Road Ahead

Thinking of the road ahead, it behooves us to inoculate leaderships and the lobbyists in the U.S. that the road ahead may require investment of political and relationship capital in order to convince U.S. lawmakers about the need for Atoms for Peace and Trust between the U.S. and India. The Indian American community and corporate lobbyists, who virtually since December 2006 are assuming that the deal is done, and that their jobs are over, need to gird up for the task ahead.

The NPT lobby needs a hard and clear reply from friends of India who should emphasize how India has lost out to China and compromised its global geo-position over the past half century – all because India adhered to Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace. In addition to fortifying President Bush’s position and rallying the Republican leaderships, the lobbyists need to urgently reach out to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senator Hilary Clinton, Senator Joe Biden, Rep. Tom Lantos, and other Democrat leaders.

In this last lap of efforts, hopefully we shall not make the mistake made while lobbying for the Hyde Act – where many of us missed the attention required to the details, mostly because we did not have enough resources to analyze the fine print sufficiently. Luckily, now the core issues have been distilled very clearly and the economics is very clear, which makes it easier to make concise arguments – thus every occasion can be maximized by using the minimum time. The deal is not dead. Long live the deal.

U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY - When will we see an H-1B philosophy in India?

The U.S., a nation of immigrants, has modified immigration laws every decade or so to reflect the needs of American economy ever since 1891 when the first Immigration Act was passed. Traditionally immigration policies were meant to serve the needs of an insulated, domestic U.S. economy; however the 21^st century has created a new challenge. In order to compete globally, U.S. now needs to design policies that respond to both, global and domestic economy, rather than only domestic economy.

The centerpiece in this new era of immigration is the H-1B visa for specialty workers, started in 1990, which is heavily used by U.S. companies to import skilled IT staff. Many of these entities are actually U.S. arms of foreign companies who provide a range of IT services to their clients in the U.S. The letter by senators Durbin and Grassley is a simple exercise in determining if these companies are complying with U.S. law, and such letters are common practice when ever a lawmaker desires to gather more information.

The facts will be known soon once the nine companies submit the details they have been required to furnish, and we can probably expect that all of them have been complying with laws. However, the letter also serves to investigate to what degree Indian firms have taken advantage of the loopholes in a broken system. The core question relates to wages – are the H-1B employees being hired on a similar salary as their American counterparts? The current laws are framed such that companies can be in compliance, yet can pay a lower salary to the new hire, thus the question for these nine Indian companies is not whether they are wrong in law, but to what extent do they “under-pay” their hires? This behavior can be exhibited by any company, be it of Indian origin, or a hundred year old American company, so there is nothing “Indian” about this.

If, as is expected, the targeted Indian firms have been in compliance with law then there can be virtually no penalty since they have not broken any law; but yes if any one has been under-paying then they can expect immense pressures from the American public, their customers, and U.S. lawmakers who will ensure that wages are now at par with U.S. economy’s statistical averages. The data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor is inadequate and is not verified sufficiently – thus a scientific analysis so far has not been possible, though reports by some advocacy groups say that average H-1B salaries are about 20% lower than their American counterparts.

The complicated nature of U.S. immigration debate is further highlighted when critics argue that U.S. policy should attract long term talent, and blame the H-1B program of not helping America’s competitiveness by citing the fact that Infosys applied for 22,590 H-1B visas and requested 99 green cards in 2006, while Wipro applied for 19,450 H-1B visas but only 69 green cards in 2006.

While we await the findings of the letter, India will be well served to keep four things uppermost in mind. One, hopefully these firms have been in legal compliance, however if they have indulged in wage arbitrage then in future they will need to rectify their wages. Indian firms need to be globally competitive, and that includes playing by fair rules in any market they operate, be it in India or in the U.S. Two, this whole matter is currently under Congressional purview, and U.S. administration has little or no role, thus any arguments that are made should reach the U.S. lawmakers rather than the administration. Unless the industry complains to the Indian government and then the matter is taken up with the U.S. administration.

Thirdly, India needs to pay acute attention to WTO Mode 4 negotiations to ensure that Indian services companies operate with utmost ethics and are not discriminated against in any market. And, lastly, most urgent, this is a wake up call for India to learn from the example of the U.S. which goes to such lengths to attract talent; and think about its own policies for attracting worldwide talent and building a competitive Indian economy – an H-1B program in India?

U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - Imagineering Atoms for Peace and Trust. In 2007, we need to leverage 1953 and 1959

New Delhi & Washington, DC - The regime of Atoms for Peace enunciated by Eisenhower in 1953, has guided the utilization of atomic energy globally. President Eisenhower's legacy has at least prevented any nuclear warfare ever since – but now, half a century later, it is time to modify it into Atoms for Peace and Trust in order to serve the geo-strategic and economic needs of the U.S. and India in the 21^st century. The birthing of Atoms for Peace and Trust is rooted in history, diplomacy, contemporary geo-politics, and cross-cultural trust.

· Reminder to Indian Leaderships – 1959, and 2007

India was capable to test a nuclear device in 1959 or so, and by not testing till 1974 it fell behind China, which tested in 1964 and joined the nuclear club. India’s decision has had a most profound negative impact over the past half century on India’s geo-position in the world, especially vis-à-vis China. India’s loyal adherence to Atoms for Peace till 1974 cost it heavily.

The 123 agreement has presented an opportunity after 50 years for the Indian leadership to again measure the landscape and take steps, which fifty years hence should not seem like the oversight of 1959. These steps include immediate intervention at highest political levels – PM Singh is urged to speak with President Bush, Speaker Pelosi, and explain why India's nuclear economics is running head-on with the constraints in the Hyde Act, and imagineer a way forward. He must be backed by intense diplomacy, and faces the task of achieving India’s economic interests by forceful persuasion in private diplomacy and in public, if need be.

It is almost two years since July 18, 2005, and it is most unfortunate that sections in the U.S. leadership are under the impression that India is being “greedy”, and is asking for more after having agreed to a deal. There is something drastically amiss here. The onus is on India to clarify how things have come to this pass, and take remedial steps.

If, as Indian negotiators say, India had all along pointed out its objections and handed over a 12-page dossier to the U.S. as early as July 2006, then the creation of this perception gap between Washington, DC and New Delhi has been a failure on India’s part to communicate loud and clear. Key points from the 12-page dossier and Singh’s speech should have been vigorously and repeatedly informed to every lawmaker, media, and think tanks, and red flags waved against the draft bills at each stage of the law making process.

The paid lobbyists of the government of India, the Indian American lobbyists, and corporate lobbyists have done a great job in building a general favorable environment, but we all also have failed to communicate. Most lobbyists glossed over India’s objections, thinking that this was another one of those typical Indian negotiating styles, and that the strategic context of the deal will awe India into an agreement. This was a very big mistake – Indian objections were not properly analyzed and communicated to the target audience.

Thus, between 1959 and 2007, there are two major lessons for India. One, do not let go of another strategic opportunity which will affect the next century of Indian global aspirations; and second, communicate aggressively and clearly. On both of these counts it is now incumbent upon Indian leadership led by PM Singh to take the charge and move immediately.

· Reminder to U.S. Leaderships – 1953, and 2007

When Eisenhower conceptualized and executed his nuclear paradigm in 1953, it is well known that he took a calculated risk, since “…Atoms for Peace threatened to lead to greater nuclear proliferation and could contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Eisenhower recognized these dangers but believed that the risks were acceptable and that potential benefits justified them.” 2007 Half a century later, the U.S. is poised at another such juncture in world affairs.

Atoms for Peace deftly integrated the exploitation of the atom for peaceful and also military purposes, while also capturing the economic potential for the U.S. so that it did not lose out to Soviet, British, or French competition in the world’s nuclear energy markets. Eisenhower helped India develop civil nuclear program through Atoms for Peace, and Nehru upheld the trust and refused to test in 1959 before China did in 1964, though India had the scientific and technical capacity to test at that point of time, as recorded even in Eisenhower Archives.

India risked its security – China invaded India in 1962. Even after that, until India felt threatened by the ping-pong diplomacy of Kissinger with China; and the U.S. turned militarily against India vis-à-vis East Pakistan in 1971; the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi refused to test till 1974. It may safely be concluded that India therefore will not test, until its supreme national interest is threatened.

Meanwhile, India’s nuclear program even before Atoms for Peace, and ever since 1948 under its founding father Dr. Bhabha has been built around the philosophy and economics of using a home resource versus an imported raw material. The technology is not exactly there yet, but signs are clearly positive that in next 10-20 years India could jump-start its nuclear energy production where the majority input will be domestic thorium. The 123 agreement is striking at the heart of this paradigm by denying reprocessing rights.

The lesson of 1953 for the U.S. leadership is clear – it should imagineer a newer paradigm of Atoms for Peace that will look into the challenges of the 21^st century rather than of an era long past. President Bush and U.S. leadership now face an Eisenhower-ian moment – to take a calculated risk that if India tests it will be only to protect its security based upon the then international situation; against the potential strategic and economic benefits from an exchange of Atoms for Peace and Trust with India in this new century

Prime Minister Singh needs to do two things. President Bush needs to do one thing

U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - The ABC of the logjam of 123. It is the economics, not politics.

That there is an impasse in defining the contours of U.S. India civil nuclear cooperation is evident to any lay observer – though cautious optimism is still in abundance. Let it be said upfront, this article argues that the current impasse in the U.S. – India civil nuclear deal is due to factors which are economic, and not political.

In analyzing, designing, and implementing the strategies that could break this impasse, many good folks both in the governmental and public spheres are looking at a political solution – assuming that a bold stroke at the highest political levels will cut this Gordian knot. This article is a call to pause and urgently consider not only the political economy of U.S. – India relations, but to consider the underlying economics in each country. The underlying economic will in the U.S. is no doubt pushing for the nuke deal; however the same cannot be said of the Indian side.

In India, as in the U.S., the political will is subservient to the economic will, and the foot–dragging that we see from the Indian political establishment is a reflection of the tensions that are bubbling over from the underlying economics of India’s nuclear policies ever since independence. Thus, the biggest challenge to the consummation of the 123 agreement is from the economics of nuclear policies that India is pursuing – contrary to the opinion gaining ground in many quarters that the current logjam is due to political differences between the U.S. and India.

This distinction – economic versus political – is extremely important to identify so that the negotiators and well-wishers in both countries address the right issues and are not misled into investing their energies up the wrong path. Signals and statements coming from U.S. lawmakers and then from M/s Burns, Boucher, Stratford since January indicate that they expect a political breakthrough will help resolve the contentious issues in the last mile of this agreement. Unfortunately even the public and corporate lobbyists, who might have been expected to have a deeper understanding of the ground situation in India, have also chosen to assume that now it is up to India to step up to the plate, if need be at the highest political levels. This is an erroneous and premature position to hold.

The ABC of India’s nuclear economics

The current stalemate in the negotiations is due to the fact that some clauses of the proposed nuke deal have run head-on against established Indian planning about its civil nuclear program. The established Indian paradigm – a framework developed over 50 years – has some key economic considerations which Indian technocrats are loath to cast aside, and which merit a cold analysis. The foremost variable in this economics is re-processing, and here is how re-processing is vital to the value-chain of India’s nuclear economics:

A.) Thorium is a lower cost per unit source of nuclear energy, albeit the technology is still in its infancy, yet India is a world leader in exploiting this technology

B.) In order to generate nuclear energy from thorium, the thorium cycle needs to have as its input the byproduct which is coming out from the uranium cycle. That is, energy is first generated from the uranium, and then the byproduct from the uranium cycle is fed into a thorium cycle, which then fires a release of energy using thorium as raw material.

C.) India has the world’s second largest reserves of thorium, over 30%, as against only about 0.7% of uranium reserves, and seemingly it is better economics to exploit energy from a resource which is in abundance at home, and much lower in unit costs, (i.e. thorium), rather than from a strategic material that is imported, and higher in unit costs (i.e. uranium).

The above paradigm of Indian nuclear economics, however, needs to co-exist with a uranium-fed energy cycle, since India cannot fully utilize its thorium raw resource unless it has at least some reactors working on the uranium cycle, so that those reactors generate just enough amounts of the byproduct which can then be fed into thorium cycle to generate energy.

Thus, economics would dictate that India should use just the right and minimal number of reactors powered by uranium, so that enough byproduct is available from these uranium cycles, which can then be fed into as many thorium reactors as possible or needed. And this is where the rub lies.

So, where is the ball?

If an interpretation of the Hyde Act of 2006 leaves no scope for the re-processing of imported uranium, then the above ABC of India’s nuclear economics goes for a toss – and that is the challenge which all parties are facing, and that is where the 123 logjam is located.

In our search for the proverbial ball, may it be humbly submitted that the ball is in everyone’s court.

· Indian Technocrats - The challenge for the technocrats in India’s nuclear establishment is how to reconcile the above said economics with what is on offer, plus at the same time offer a credible roadmap for generating the targeted levels of energy from nuclear resources.

· Indian Government - The dilemma for the Indian governmental leadership is to square the circle which it drew when PM Manmohan Singh gave the speech at the Indian parliament on August 17, 2006 – assuring his detractors that India’s supreme national interest would be the determinant while inking the 123 deal. The political will cannot go against the economic determinism served up by the technocrats.

· U.S. Government - The constraints for the U.S. administration are laid out in the Hyde Act – and the executive cannot stretch the envelope beyond a certain shape. Yet, maybe the most creative solution can come from them since they are the best placed to know of the constraints and deal-making possibilities that this path-shattering deal can open up.

· U.S. Congress – Not much unlike a Pandora’s Box, the nuke deal has opened up possibilities in the gestalt of U.S.-India relations, and global political economy, which will have repercussions well into the foreseeable future. U.S. lawmakers face the daunting task of reconciling these potential trajectories in the gestalt versus their own political, ideological, and economic analysis.

· The Lobbyists – The readying of champagne bottles aside, corporate and public lobbyists for the nuke deal need to take a large dose of the energy drink Red Bull, spend immediate and urgent time in understanding the ABC of India’s nuclear economics, and jump back in the process to educate and build a commonality of views on the banks of the Potomac and the Yamuna. The simple fact is that the job is no where done yet – and energies need to be invested. Big time.

How to cut the Gordian knot?

Reconcile the economics – politics will follow.

The first and foremost is that all parties should focus and fully analyze India’s nuclear economics. Secondly, the stakeholders should not worry where the ball is – it is in each one of our courts. Thirdly, all parties need to proactively and urgently support the governmental interlocutors who are deep in the trenches, and assist them with facts and any such inputs that could help them to be creative in solutioneering a way out of the current status quo. This article itself is an attempt in that direction.

Each of the above mentioned parties needs to introspect, juggle its techno-economic and strategic frameworks, and then engage in a clinical dialogue within their governments, lawmakers, and constituencies. It is highly improbable now for the Indian establishment to meander beyond the scope of the August 17 2006 speech of PM Manmohan Singh, and none can afford to side-step the economics of civil nuclear energy atypical to India – this neglect has been building up since July 18 2005, and may now come home to roost.

There are urgency, fatigue, and frustration setting in and the chips are going to fall pretty soon – do we heave ho, and give one last chance to economics, or do we lay our bet with politics? I will go with economics.

U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - An urgent call to action for the Indian Diasporas around the world

The nuclear deal between the U.S. and India galvanized the Indian American community to lobby for a goal which promised a quantum jump in U.S.-India relations, as well addressed the energy security needs of India’s fast growing economy. The last mile of a mutual agreement is yet to be finalized, but amendment to domestic U.S. law which sets the context for the bilateral nuclear agreement has been hailed as a major milestone in U.S – India relations. This landmark was achieved more by social entrepreneurship than by any other strategy, and herein lays the seed to the next frontier of public diplomacy which the Indian Diasporas globally now need to internalize, and act urgently upon.

There is a clear cut need to action, and a specific roadmap to the mobilization of efforts, towards public diplomacy that will help secure India’s energy needs. The proposed action by the Indian Diasporas will aid one of the most ambitious efforts in modern history to lift the quality of life of millions in the shortest period of time. The Indian Diasporas in countries around the globe can now play a meaningful role in making nuclear energy a reality in India, and thereby also pioneer a global lobbying machine that will stand India well in stead for centuries to come.

This call to action goes out to all people of Indian origin living in the member countries of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This exhortation seeks to stimulate social entrepreneurship amongst the Indian Diasporas and calls upon it to engage with the leaderships in their home countries in order to convince them to support India’s case at the upcoming Annual Plenary Meeting of the NSG, scheduled to be held in South Africa. The Campaign for Indian and Global Energy Solutions (CIGES) has already begun since the last few weeks, and it needs vibrant inputs from social entrepreneurs, community leaders, and the passive Indian Diasporas across the globe. The campaign is not driven or platform-ed by any organization and will have its activists and leaders logically emerging from different countries as the campaign progresses in coming months.

At this juncture it may be relevant to paint the mosaic which forms the backdrop of this unprecedented call to public diplomacy. First, and foremost, the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and India (the 123 agreement) is yet to be finally negotiated, and mutually agreed upon by the U.S. and India. Yes, there are hiccups there, yet many people are giving their best to make it a mature and satisfactory agreement for both India and the U.S., and therefore there is a high probability that the outstanding issues will be resolved. Thus, this campaign builds on the pre-supposition that the 123 agreement will be inked – however the core argument and activities being undertaken in this campaign will deliver strategic value even if the 123 agreement is postponed or delayed.

Second, once the 123 agreement is approved by both countries, then India has to approach the NSG for granting it exemption from the sanctions which have thus far prevented India from engaging in trade and transfer of nuclear materials and technology. The next annual plenary session of the NSG is scheduled in South Africa, and India’s case will be taken up by the NSG only if the 123 agreement has been consummated between the U.S. and India by then. Urgent efforts are afoot in the U.S. and India, in both governmental and public spheres, to meet this deadline, and the Indian American community has to keep its focus on enabling a mutually satisfactory 123 agreement, while the global Diasporas readies for lobbying with the NSG.

It is only after the NSG lifts the sanctions on India that nuclear energy can become a reality in India. Also, it should be noted that the NSG operates by unanimous consent, and any one member can hold up or delay India’s case. However, the chances of NSG approval are reasonably high, given India’s record, and as well the fact that U.S. will be lobbying with other NSG members for India’s case, once the 123 agreement has been signed between the U.S. and India. This is not to say that it is an assured home-run, and therein is the genesis for this call to engage in active public diplomacy by the Indian Diasporas.

By lobbying in their home countries to support India’s case at the NSG, people of Indian origin can make a landmark contribution to India’s energy security, and thereby its socio-economic growth. By engaging with law makers, opinion leaders, think tanks, media, and the nuclear power industry in their adopted homelands, they can add the punch of public diplomacy to the efforts of the people of India to obtain rightful access to civil nuclear energy.

Classic propaganda theorists often say that communities need a “super-ordinate goal” in order to rally behind any idea. The nuclear issue provided the super-ordinate goal to the Indian American community, which then rallied behind a grand idea. No other issue has ever stirred the community like the nuclear issue, and therein also came the opportunity for many to take a lead in social entrepreneurship and public diplomacy. Time has now come for the global Indian Diasporas to grab this opportunity in order to achieve two critical objectives – one, establish the super-ordinate goal for the Indian Diasporas to help India’s energy needs by lobbying with the NSG, and, two, take advantage of the existence of this super-ordinate goal to build momentum for grassroots activism, public diplomacy and lobbying globally. Both of these objectives are very valuable to the global eco-system and India in the present, and in times to come.

The Indian American community has in a way pioneered a path of public diplomacy and ethnic lobbying, and now it is incumbent upon Indian communities in other countries to carry the baton once the theatre is shifting to the NSG. The over 25 million strong Diaspora already sends home to India over US$ 24 billion every year – more than any other ethnic Diasporas, and is estimated to have a GDP of over US$ 250 billion by some rough estimates.

The Diasporas is not only a knowledge or capital bank – it is also a marketing and lobbying force that has not been tapped or scientifically harnessed. Knowledge and capital will flow into India in abundance once the India story is properly told to as many people globally as possible. In any country, the logical first set of people to tell the India story are the people of Indian origin living in that country – it is time they engaged in public diplomacy, and it is also time that they be supported by India and others who have a stake in India’s socio-economic development.

Lest it be misconstrued by the Diasporas that this is merely a one way street, it should be noted that India’s growth offers them economic opportunities – and many of them are already chasing and benefiting from opportunities in India. With the Indian economy expected to grow at over 10% in 2007, compared to sluggish economies of the West, India offers perhaps the most attractive investment destination to the Indian Diasporas. They should also note that outward investment from India is growing, and Indian companies are setting up offices or acquiring firms in foreign lands – thus creating business opportunities, or jobs for them or their children in years to come. The official changeover of the Ritz Carlton in Boston to the Taj Boston a few days ago is a symbol of the growing economic opportunities that India and Indian business is now spawning at a ferocious rate.

The activism of the Indian American community was driven both by sensing an economic opportunity, as well the emotional context. The experience of cross-cultural marketing, ethnic mobilization, grassroots activism, other communications and messaging strategies, debate and agenda setting, financial management, and Washington, DC style lobbying can now be shared with Indian Diasporas globally. This business model is now being modified and contextualized for the next level of Indian Diasporas activism as strategic and value added global citizens.

The Indian Diasporas worldwide is waking up to the Indian opportunity a little later than the Indian American, but the Indian growth story is now hitting their shores and minds and the NSG campaign is a historic opportunity for them to fast-track their relations with India and connect with opportunities in India too. The just concluded Prawasi Bhartiya Diwas was an apt occasion to spread the word and exhort as many people of Indian origin as possible, yet the opportunity was not leveraged to the fullest extent. However, at least a beginning has been made and several dynamics in public diplomacy are now moving to give a quantum impetus to the campaign with NSG countries. This effort has to move in tandem with the final resolution of the 123 agreement, and of course the IAEA negotiations.

Let us focus and lend our energies and entrepreneurial skills to the acceptance of India as a rightful participant in global affairs. 1 , 2 , 3 ….. ready to go?

U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - A fruitful strategy? The strategy of apples, oranges, and pears must deliver

As Congress convenes after Thanksgiving, and with the nuclear bill expected to go into conference between the House and Senate, the strategy and hopes of all stakeholders promoting a radical maturing of U.S. – India relations may best be captured in a quote from Ronald Reagan, who is once reported to have said, “…if an apple and an orange went into conference consultations, it might come out a pear”.

We do have an apple and an orange going into conference – and we do clearly need a pear. In fact, so far this has also been the strategy of the U.S. administration – to introduce a bill which would have minimum roadblocks in the House and Senate, while the contentious issues, especially those which are not palatable to India, are expected to be reconciled in the conference after both houses had passed their respective bills.

Well, now that the Senate and House have both passed their own versions of the bill, and the two are coming up at the conference, the shape of the final bill needs to be different than the tone and content of the apple and orange which have showed up at the conference. The administration has a full job on its hands to now amalgamate the two bills, plus as well address the key concerns of India in the final version of the bill that goes to President Bush for his signing. We need a pear, if you will.

In the euphoria and well-earned moments of partial victory after the bill was passed in the Senate last month, most attention was on making sure that the so-called “killer-amendments” which were introduced, did not end up as part of the bill. Non-inclusion of the killer-amendments subsequent to the debate in the full Senate is definitely welcome – however what is often missed is the fact that the main body of bill that was presented to the floor of the Senate itself has components which are unacceptable to the Indian governmental and political establishments. The same is the case with the bill passed by the House.

It must not be missed that the Indian establishment voiced a guarded welcome to the passage of the bill in the Senate, and in the same breath went on to say that it awaits the final version of the bill – no point speculating about apples and oranges, while you are expecting a pear, isn’t it? The official reaction in Delhi was a studied contrast to the buoyant expressions from the U.S. administration and the corporate and grassroots lobbyists – one could almost sense a pregnant pause as if the Indian establishment was girding itself for some difficult choices it might face in the near future.

A strategy of apples, oranges and pears may be understandable to those practiced in the art of lobbying and legislative-executive relations inside the Beltway. However, it is not much understood outside the Beltway, has raised the stakes for the conference, and now requires substantive efforts by the administration and lobbyists. In two articles over the past few months, one had urged for more urgent action to address some of these concerns at the committee stage itself, before the bills were introduced to the full legislative floors. That would have lessened the burden at the conference stage, and at the same time muted some of the vocal opponents in India by demonstrating to them that Indian concerns were being incorporated in the legislations moving through the House and Senate. It might have even helped PM Singh in withstanding the domestic pressures, and enabled him to ward off any casting in stone of Indian conditions, which he was compelled to do in his speech to the Indian parliament on August 17 2006.

Well, that is water past the bridge, and we continue with the strategy of apples, oranges and pears. However, the lesson needs to be internalized – since, beyond the conference, and President Bush’s signing of a bill, is the issue of the 123 agreement – or the bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India. We cannot afford to push back reconciliation of pending issues beyond the conference stage, and then hope to fine tune matters when the 123 agreement is being finalized.

Public diplomacy by the Indian American community, and lobbying by corporate and Indian governmental interests, needs to help mitigate as many of the irritants as possible at the earliest – within the conference itself. The lobbyists have generally been more focused on ensuring broad support and legislative calendaring of the bills, while the administration has been burdened more with shaping the content of the bill. It is time that the lobbyists took an urgent look at the contents of the bill – what use will be all our efforts if the final bill emerging out of conference is a non-starter for a mature hand shake of the two largest democracies?

And this leads us to a fundamental question which we will face sooner rather than later – why is it so important to examine potential Indian objections, and is India being the coy girl on the sidelines of the dance floor who refuses to step up unless she is wooed with extra concessions? On the face of it, it seems that the Indian stance is an expression of its interpretation of the July 2005 framework and the March 2006 separation plan. Having drawn an interpretation based upon these two agreements, the Indian side is now officially awaiting the end result of the legislative sumo in the U.S. Congress. There is not much to suggest that the assumptions of the Indian side, as articulated by PM Singh on August 17, are at variance with what the U.S. administration has broadly committed, or indicated that it would go along.

The Indian government too is laying much faith by the apples, oranges, and pears strategy – asking critiques of the deal to hold their horses till the final version of the bill appears out of the conference. In addition, it has another argument to offer to the detractors of the deal in India – telling them that the U.S. administration would not have been pushing for the deal unless it were sure that they could convince the U.S. lawmakers about a bill which is digestible in India. Or, the U.S. administration is aware that it needs to deliver a pear, and India awaits the fruits of the deal which it inked on July 18 2005.

We must ensure a fruitful outcome to the strategy of apples, oranges and pears.

U.S. - INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL - When is a deal a deal? Don't relent and keep working - it is only a bill so far

Language is a funny thing. And on top of it limited space in air or print media often necessitate short phrases which attempt to convey the maximum in the shortest possible time or space. And then the short hand takes on a life of its own and both the masses and the media come to believe that the short hand is the real thing.

As the fate of civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India makes it way through the American legislative processes, it is critical for the lobbyists and supporters, analysts, and general public to keep in mind several points before we conclude that a civil nuclear “deal” has been made between the two countries.

1. The first thing to keep in mind is that the content and conditions of any final bill which is passed by both houses of the U.S. Congress, and then signed into law by President Bush, will then need to be signed off by the Indian government in order to consummate a “deal”. It is only then that the governmental interlocutors and lobbyists can take a well earned vacation, and the media can declare that we do have a deal. Any champagne popping in the interim has to wait.

However, there may be a penultimate stage wherein it could still be said that we do have a “deal”. That will be the stage when the Senate version of the bill (yet to be passed, or may be passed by the time this article appears) is reconciled with the House version of the bill (already passed), and if the reconciled final version of the bill does not have any apparent irritants which may roil the support for the deal in India. This is the stage at which the outcome is the most important for civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India.

2. Laser like focus and attention should be on nature of conditions attached to the finalized bill which emerges from the U.S. Congress. Such attached conditions to the finalized bill are critical for the fate of the bill to either morph into a deal or flounder as a wannabe deal.

A final nuclear cooperation bill from the U.S. Congress will be subject to intense scrutiny in India and measured against the July 18th 2005 framework. Government interlocutors in both countries have been working over time and incessantly to bridge the gaps between what the U.S. Congress could finally demand, and what PM Manmohan Singh committed in his speech to the Indian parliament on August 17th 2006.

As of last analyses, there were nineteen potential amendments that have been touted by lawmakers in the US Senate, and there are nine clear cut objections voiced by Indian parliamentarians. If amongst the amendments incorporated in the Senate, or finalized version of the, bill there are any that fundamentally collide with Indian objections, then the chances of a “deal” are virtually nil. We may have a bill, but we won’t have a deal.
3. There are two broad aspects – ideology and deal-making - that will make or mar the fate of the nuclear bill in the US Congress. The ideological arguments and opposition have to be countered by ideology and rational arguments, plus the larger picture of US-India relations – after all the proposed agreement is about building mature trust between the two democracies as much as it is about energy. The deal making, on the other hand is about give-and-take on Capitol Hill between the U.S. administration and lawmakers, and between lawmakers of different groupings.

There is support in both countries and amongst lawmakers for a ‘deal”, yet the devil lies in the details – it may wear Prada, but it needs both ideology and deal-making to succeed in creating a win-win for all parties concerned. Lobbyists for the government of India, for corporate interests, and those representing the grassroots have been using their arsenals of ideology, political grassroots pressure, personal and institutional relationships, and campaign finance to get sufficient face time with the lawmakers and convince them of the merits of a “deal” with India.

4. Lobbying for the bill has always been two pronged – one, ensuring that the bill comes up for discussions in the legislative chambers at the earliest (foreign relations committees of both houses, then the full House of Representatives, and now in the full Senate); and two, countering the arguments in favor of “deal-breaker” clauses attached to the bill in its various incarnations.

At each stage when the bill has come for discussions in the committees or the full chamber, and passed, a sense of victory has permeated the proponents of a “deal”. Savoring limited victory is good – especially when it keeps the passion and momentum of the proponents in high gear for the next battle. However, declaring victory is immature till the finalized bill has been drafted and the nine Indian versus nineteen American concerns vetted in the language of the bill.

5. And this brings us to the last key point of this article – timing. Haste and chaos are at times useful in befuddling the adversary – the urgency imposed due to the need to pass the final bill within the lame duck session of the Senate may help in scuttling arguments of the opponents, however, on the other hand, a bill that is passed with “deal-breakers”, due to the pressures of time, may be just that – a deal-breaker.

The energies being spent in battling the pressures of time should not take away from the energies required to mitigate and eliminate the contentious clauses from being attached to the bill. Relentless effort and acute attention to detail are required to make a success of this emerging bill – and to then call it a deal.

In the larger picture of things the fate of the bill in the lame duck session does not matter for the lobbyists and friends of deeper, wider, and mature relations between the US and India – they have to work relentlessly to convert the underlying strategic intent of this bill into a win-win relationship between the US and India. A civil nuclear deal between the two countries would be a great start.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS - Its the public, stupid

The Bush administration suffered a loss of public faith in the just concluded U.S. mid-term elections, and now the President must govern with a legislative branch that is controlled by the Democrats. The change in this dynamic will no doubt affect the two remaining years of the Bush presidency. Several factors accentuated the loss for Bush, not the least a historic trend that President’s normally suffer a loss in their sixth year in office – a study shows that on an average Presidents’ have lost 31 seats in the House and 6 seats in the Senate in their sixth year. Bush could not buck the trend.

Impact on U.S. – India relations

Of course, the top concern amongst friends of India is the fate of the U.S. – India nuclear deal. In order not to miss the forest for the trees, the foremost thing to keep in mind is that the nuclear deal is nothing but a surrogate for building trust and a mature understanding between the U.S. and India to face the challenges of their domestic and international interests in a very complicated 21st century.

That being said, the next import of the deal lies in a pair of very urgent and specific needs of both the U.S. and India. India needs the deal for its energy security. India is slated to be the third largest global economy by 2050, behind China, and the U.S., and its ability to lift millions out of poverty depends on its ability to feed its economy with the energy it needs. The U.S. on the other hand needs the deal for protecting and defining its geo-political contours in the 21st century. Especially when the global balance of economic power is shifting to the Asia-Pacific theatre, and when a vibrant democracy of one billion people is providing a stabilizing influence in global affairs.

The challenges to the deal have always been two fold. From the American perspective, it is about not compromising on some principles that relate to nuclear non-proliferation, and set an unprecedented exception for India. The Democrats, for whatsoever reasons, have been more vocal on that record – and the fact that the U.S. administration did not consult in due protocol with the legislative branch miffed several of them - understandably more Democrats felt slighted than Republicans.

On the other hand, from the Indian perspective, amongst those voicing concern at the Prime Minister’s pioneering initiative was a sense of not wanting to lose out on the traditional independence in Indian foreign policy, and not wanting to subject Indian scientific research, and nuclear doctrine, to foreign interferences.

Both the above challenges to the deal are coming from domestic constituencies – it is a matter of public opinion in the U.S. versus public opinion in India.


What will happen now?

What happens now will be no different than what would have happened in a Republican dominated legislature – albeit some more twists in the conditions attached to the bill may be anticipated. And herein is the moot point which is being maybe missed by many while reading the tea leaves. The finalized nuclear bill will pass - either by end of this year (low probability) or some time next year. Once the bill has been passed it will then be presented to India as the conclusive framework in which the U.S. will engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India.

The defining moment will come when India will be presented with the final bill, and its tagged conditions. The operative part – the crucial part – for all interested stakeholders is to focus on these tagged conditions. A legislature dominated by the Democrats may mean that the conditions tagged to the bill are more unpalatable to India. Such a bill, with unpalatable conditions, presented to India will put PM Manmohan Singh in a bind. He has already promised to the Indian parliament certain parameters within which India will engage and do a “deal” with the U.S. The North Korean nuclear test has not helped either – the NPT lobby in Washington, DC has more arguments now, and so do Indian opponents of the deal who argue that the global theatre is too unpredictable for India to compromise on its nuclear option.

Who can do what now?

The Indian American community has been working very hard to build bipartisan bridges over the past few years. Rep. Pelosi, Sen. Reid, Sen. Biden, and Rep. Lantos, are pivotal players now, and along with Rep. Hastert, Sen. Frist, Sen. Lugar, and Sen. Hyde, can be counted to deliver a mature framework – but they all have to be convinced that their public wants a bill with minimal conditions.

The Indian American community has heavily spent its chips – on events, fund-raisers, phone, fax, and e-mail campaigns, personal meetings, etc., and needs some oxygen along with robust efforts by the government of India and corporate lobbyists like the US India Business Council.

Support for deeper relations between the two countries is bipartisan amongst the leaders and the publics of U.S. and India – the devil lies in the details. The public in the U.S. have to be convinced that the conditions tagged to the nuclear bill be minimal and conform to the July 18 framework. After all, the leaders, be they in the U.S. or India, reflect the will of their peoples.

It is public versus public.

U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS - The Tao of U.S. - India Relations in the 21st Century - Four Urgent Steps Needed Now for a Giant Leap in Global Affairs

New Delhi - There needs to be a wake up call and immediate action by all parties who have any interest in a true handshake of synergies between the U.S. and India. The civil nuclear deal is in the last stages of being framed for posterity, and unless the nine contentious issues, the nine pins standing, are resolved, the whole framework may fall apart.

Though the TAO© (Tasks for Achieving Objectives) for a giant leap in U.S. – India relations are constantly evolving, yet four crucial tasks need immediate and precise action. Indian parliamentarians have objected to nine key clauses contained in the House and Senate versions of the deal. It is critical that the U.S. Senate, House, executive branch, corporate lobbyists, Indian American pressure groups, think tanks, and the media take fuller cognizance of the ground realities in India, and act with urgency, and not get misled by mere “passage of the deal in the Senate”.

Task 1 – Interpreting the message across cultures.

India has matrixed itself into a corner where it almost cannot accept any variation to the July 18 parameters of the nuclear deal, a message that was loud and clear in the speech by the Indian PM to the parliament on August 17 2006, made due to compelling domestic pressures which had been building up ever since July 18 2005.

A failure by the stakeholders to accord due seriousness to the message emanating from Indian democracy may prove disastrous for the fate of the deal. High context cultures like India, where the exact verbal or written words may not be the complete message, seldom articulate a message that is cut and dry like a lawyer’s brief. Such clear cut messages are more a hallmark of low context cultures, like the U.S., where the totality of the message is supposed to be captured by the exact written or verbal word. Indian PM’s speech of August 17 was very low context, since it clearly defines the parameters of U.S. – India civil nuclear cooperation, and does not leave much to imagination.

The message is simple – the Indian executive branch may well be forced to walk away from the deal if the contours of the said deal are pressured beyond the July 18 joint statement. Any and all stakeholders, opinion leaders, and decision makers need to consider this message at its face value.

Task 2 – Ahoy! All hands on deck.

Recognizing the ramifications of the message, it is but necessary for all hands to focus their efforts on resolving the nine contentious issues, rather than diluting their energies in symbolisms. Of course the U.S. executive branch is focused on the nuts and bolts; and of course the paid lobbyists are expected to lob ideas to change specific clauses; however the broader players in public diplomacy comprising of the Indian American community, the think tanks, and several other sympathizers of the deal, are paying inadequate attention to the irritants in the deal. This oversight on the part of broader public diplomacy in not addressing the core and specific issues of disagreement between the U.S. and India may prove to be a costly mistake. Public diplomacy by the commons, and opinion leaders within the commons, has to intervene urgently and intelligently to address the realpolitik of U.S. India relations.

It may be the classic trap of everybody thinking that somebody else is minding the store, and nobody ends up doing the task. At the time of writing this article, it is not even confirmed whether the deal will be scheduled in the legislative calendar of the Senate in the current session, which expires on October 6th. The different layers of lobbying for pragmatic U.S. – India relations have to mesh and ensure that symbolisms, imagery, and the nuts and bolts are aligned to deliver the TAO© of mutual synergies between the oldest and largest democracy on this planet.

Task 3 – Win minor battles. Knock down as many pins now.

There are expectations in many quarters that most, if not all, contentious issues will be addressed at the conference stage. The assumption, rightly so, is that the U.S. administration will have a more relevant role to play at the stage when the final version of the bill is being negotiated between the House and Senate.

However this strategy raises the stakes at the conference stage. It would be far more pragmatic to remove as many barriers to success as possible at the earliest, so that the interlocutors at the conference stage have fewer battles to fight. There are lessons to be learnt from Sun Tzu’s advocacy on the timing and size of battles – victory in war is better assured if you have won the minor battles in time. Why create a mega battle if you have the time, strategy, and ability to win the minor battles?

Lately there have been references to the growing voice of the Indian American community in mainstream America, and comparisons are being made with the clout wielded by the Jewish American community. At this critical juncture the Indian American community needs to take another leaf from Jewish methods – their success more often than not has been due to an acute attention to details, winning minor battles decisively, and averting mega battles.

Thus the task is clear for the proponents, pressure groups, and paid lobbyists of a paradigm shift in U.S. India relations – they should act now to zero in and resolve as many of the nine contentious issues, before the conference.

Task 4 – Recognize and influence the Tao of global affairs.

The concept of Tao is based upon the understanding that the only constant in the universe is change (i.e. I Ching, the “Book of Changes”), and that we must understand and be in harmony with this change. The possibilities of change in U.S. India relations are immense, and these changes will in turn define the Tao of global affairs in the 21st century. Lawmakers and the publics in both the U.S. and India need to recognize and influence this change to the best of their abilities.

Attention to TAO© will yield a better Tao of U.S. India relations and global affairs.